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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
The impetus for the present inquiry is a longstanding, well-documented inconsistency in motivation
research.

This inconsistency, which will be termed,

motive noncorrespondence, stems from the failure of
different measures of the same motive construct to
intercorrelate significantly.

Specifically, self-report

measures of intimate, affiliative, efficacious, or
dominant social motives are generally unrelated to
contentually equivalent projective measures (McClelland,
1980).

Researchers such as Entwisle (1972) and Raven

(1988) have argued that psychometric problems associated
with either projective or self-report motive measures
account for motive noncorrespondence.

For them, both

measure types tap the same construct, though one more or
less well than the other.

Others, however, find

psychometric explanations hard to swallow, as both selfreport and projective motive measures predict motiverelevant behaviors under certain conditions (McClelland,
1980) .
The present investigation examines the utility of the

bi-level explanation, a recently advanced alternate

2

explanation for motive noncorrespondence.

McClelland,

Koestner, and Weinberger (1989) contend that self-rep9rt
and projective motive measures do not interrelate
substantially because they tap distinct motivational
layers of the individual.

Projective motive measures tap

the implicit motivational system--an unconscious, affectbased arrangement that is aimed at the ongoing
satisfaction of basic, often contradictory, wishes.

Self-

report measures, on the other hand, assess a self-attributed

motivational system.

This conscious, verbal-conceptual

network is concerned with the production of
behavior consistent with both self-image and social
demands.

Through McClelland et al.'s (1989) propositions,

the psychodynamic ego and id have crept back into
motivational psychology, albeit sporting a more
contemporary, scientifically-acceptable metaphorical
clothing.

Freud (1910) and Jung (1971) derived much of

their explanatory firepower from the postulation of
dialectically opposed, or at least poorly aligned,
intrapsychic subsystems (Rychlak, 1981).

Likewise,

McClelland et al. propose that the id-like implicit system
and ego-like self-attributed system are somewhat at odds
in the normative case.

Projective and self-report motive

measures are unrelated because they tap layers of
personality that are typically incongruent.
The ensuing research seeks validation of the bi-level

3

explanation_in two different ways.

The first involves

demonstrating that projective and self-report motive
measures do in fact correspond, but only for certain
people.

Specifically, inner-directedness and other-

directedness (Wymer & Penner, 1985), two selfconsciousness variables, will be employed to identify a priori
groups for whom implicit and self-attributed systems should
and should not correspond.

To the degree that these groups

differ in predicted ways, the bi-level explanation will be
upheld.

Additionally, personal strivings (Emmons, 1989) and

personality abilities (Paulhus & Martin, 1987), two motivelike constructs, will be examined.

If the

constructs'

conceptual relations to implicit and self-attributed motives
are reflected empirically, the bi-level explanation will again
be supported.

It is noteworthy from the outset that patterns

of intermotive relationship will be examined in a way that
departs somewhat from research tradition.

Traditional

motivational investigations typically address circumscribed
motivational contents, such as achievement, power, intimacy,
and affiliation.

Presently, focal motives will be construed

as reflecting either agency or communion (Bakan, 1966) , two
broad, superordinate categories.

Agency connotes aims of

separation, mastery, and dominance, while communion reflects
aims of unity, intimacy, and nurturance.

The imposition of

4

organizational rubric affords a conceptual coherence,
clarity, and generalizability that is often lacking in_
psychological studies of more idiosyncratic, limited
dimensions (Rychlak, 1981) .
In

summary, the present investigation works at the

interface of contemporary motivational and psychodynamic
domains.

It is hoped that McClelland et al. 's (1989) bi-

level explanation, a reframing of basic psychodynamic
concepts, will help elucidate motive noncorrespondence, a
long-standing anomaly in motivational research.

CHAPTER II
IMPLICIT AND SELF-ATTRIBUTED MOTIVES
In this chapter a more detailed account of implicit
and self-attributed motives will be advanced.

Early

sections will sequentially address motives in general,
implicit and self-attributed motives in particular, and
relationships between implicit and self-attributed
motives.

Subsequent sections will examine a number of

constructs that may mediate and/or shed further light upon
relationships between the two motive types.
The Motive Construct
Before the differences between implicit motives and
self-attributed motives can be more closely examined, the
similarities between them should be underscored and
clarified.

These similarities reside in their shared

grounding in the more general idea of motive.

Motives are

abstractly defined by McClelland and his associates as
emotionally-charged groupings of ideas or images that
express basic wishes or desired experiences (Winter &
Stewart, 1978).

McAdams (1988b), for example, defines

motives as "affectively-toned cognitive clusters centered
around general preferences" (p. 71).
5

The imagistic
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component of the motive, then, is a representation of a
desired outcome in one's ongoing life; the affective
component represents a sense of vitality, press, or
urgency that accompanies the imagistic component.
While motives themselves are unobservable, they do
exert observable effects on behavior and experience.
Specifically, "motives energize, direct, and select
behavior" (McAdams, 1988b, p. 71).

Individuals high in

achievement motivation, for example, will persist longer
than others when put in an achievement-related situation,
such as taking a final examination (Atkinson & Litwin,
1960).

In other words, they become more driven or active,

sustaining achievement-related behaviors for longer
periods of time than others.

Achievement-oriented people

also can identify achievement-related words, presented
tachistoscopically, more quickly than others (McClelland &
Lieberman, 1949) : in this example, achievement-oriented
individuals selectively focus, or direct, their attention
toward achievement-related stimuli.

Finally, achievement-

oriented individuals have been found to learn moderately
difficult materials more quickly than others (McClelland,
Atkinson, Clark, & Lowell, 1953);

they more effectively

select out responses that lead to the achievement reward
(i.e., learning the materials).

More generally, a

motive's activity is inferred from the thematic ordering
it exerts upon the individual's overt and covert behavior.

7

Motives organize interpersonal behavior, fantasy,
cognition, selective attention, perception, and memory.
The motive construct can be further clarified by
identifying its philosophical grounding in Aristotelian
notions of final, formal, and efficient causation.

Causes

in general are grand meta-constructs, or predicate
assumptions, that we bring to bear in explaining or making
sense of various phenomena (Rychlak, 1981).

A final cause

is "any concept used to account for the nature of things
(including behavior) based on the assumption that there is
a reason, end, or goal 'for the sake of which' things
exist or events are carried out" (Rychlak, 1981, p. 500).
Popular final cause constructs in psychology are needs,
wishes, and goals.

A formal cause meta-construct, on the

other hand, is ''any concept used to account for the nature
of things (including human behavior) based on their
patterned organization, shape, design, or order" (Rychlak,
1981, p. 500).

Formal cause meta-constructs underlie

popular psychological concepts such as trait, personality
style, and personality type.

Efficient causes, finally,

are concepts "used to account for the nature of
things ... based on the impetus in a succession of events
over time" (Rychlak, 1981, p. 499).

Such concepts are

expressed in behaviorism's S-R laws and in cognitive
psychology's computer flowchart models.

Final, formal,

and efficient causes, then, are three different meta-

8

constructs or perspectives that we employ in grasping or
making sense of phenomena under study (e.g., motivation,
personality).

Furthermore, the three constructs are

complementary rather than mutually exclusive, each making

a valuable and distinct contribution to our construing.
In seeking to avoid the pitfalls of confounding
different framings of the same phenomenon with different
phenomena, the present paper views motives as hybrid
efficient-formal-final cause constructs that encompass
connotations of impetus, trait, and need/wish.

As is

suggested by the motive construct's historical basis in
the mechanistic drive models of Freud (1940) and Hull
(1943), motives can be seen as primary impetuses that
temporally precede behavior and actually propel the
individual into action--this sense is reflected in
McClelland's (1980) aforementioned definition of motives
as "drivers," "directors," and "selectors."

Motives also

encompass both the final-cause connotation of "need" and
the formal-cause connotation of "trait."

Many clinically-

oriented accounts of motives emphasize a final cause
connotation, likening motives to wishes or fantasies for
the sake of which individuals behave.

Motives in this

sense are imagined outcomes in the future for the sake of
which the individual acts in the present.

Motives,

however, are also trait-like in that they account for the
patternings in the individual's behavior.

More

9

specifically, the individual brings behavioral patterns
(traits) to bear in seeking attainment of a given end .
(need) associated with a motive.

The individual high in

intimacy motivation, for example, has a desire, wish, or
need for close contact with others.

In seeking to attain

close contact, the individual invokes a warm, intimacyfostering interpersonal stance, characterized by making
eye contact, smiling, and laughing (McAdams, Jackson, &
Kirshnit, 1984); the individual, in other words, evidences
intimacy-related behavioral patterns.
Implicit Motives and Self-Attributed Motives in Theory
Implicit and self-attributed motives are both motives
in the senses discussed above; both are clusterings of
feeling-toned ideas or images that account for drive,
need, and trait.

However, the two motive types do differ

from each other in a number of important ways.
Specifically, they differ in terms of (1) their mode of
operation;

(2) the classes of behavior that they

influence;

(3) the types of incentives that encourage

their expression; and (4) their proposed developmental
origins.

In this section, these differences will be

discussed more fully.

Henceforth, McClelland et al. 's

(1989) labels for representing implicit and selfattributed motives will be adopted:
be signified by an

.n,

implicit motives will

for "need" (e.g.,

n

Power,

.n

10
Achievement,

n Intimacy, etc.), and self-attributed

motives will be signified by the prefix, san, for "sel_fattributed need" (e.g., san Power, san Achievement, san
Intimacy) .
One hallmark of implicit motives' operational mode
involves a dissociation from conscious processing.
Implicit motives belong to a primitive motivational system
that "automatically influences behavior without conscious
effort" (McClelland et al., 1989, p. 698).

This is not to

say that implicit motives are unconscious in the
psychodynamic sense:

implicit motives are not necessarily

banished from awareness through the individual's active
deployment of repression and its allied defenses (Biernat,
1989).

Instead, implicit motives "comprise a motivational

system for which phenomenal (i.e., self-reflective)
awareness is not a requirement of personality functioning"
(Koestner & McClelland, 1990, p. 542).

The implicit

system, then, serves as a sort of "automatic pilot" for
spontaneous behaviors, lending them their form and
direction in the absence of conscious reflections and
deliberations.

A practical consequence of implicit

motives' unconscious operational mode is that they
orchestrate motivational and emotional life themes (i.e.,
formal-final cause orderings) that are "unevaluated as to
their appropriateness in terms of (verbal) concepts of
self, others, and what is important (McClelland et al.,
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1989, p. 698).

There is, hence, no reason to assume that

implicit motive dispositions should be in accord with the
individual's conscious, verbalized self-image, at least in
the normative case.

Indeed, it is doubtful that accurate

information pertaining to implicit motive dispositions can
be obtained via self-reports (McClelland, 1980) .
A second defining feature of implicit motives'
operational mode concerns the issue of how information is
represented.

In this case, the "information" includes

perceived and/or anticipated environmental events and
perceived and/or anticipated personal responses.

Implicit

motives, unlike the more familiar verbal-conceptual
schemas of information-processing theories, represent and
process information via an affective code.

Relevant here

is Raynor and McFarlin's (1986) distinction between

affective value and information value.

Specifically,

affective value addresses questions like, "How good or bad
does this behavior feel?" or "How good or bad do I feel
while behaving this way?."

Information value, on the

other hand, is concerned with the implications of a
behavior for the self-image, addressing questions like,
"How good or bad am I doing?"

Representation of events

based on their affective value, then, is experience-near
and almost visceral, while representation based on
information value is experience-distant and evaluative.
Implicit motives are posited to represent situations in
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terms of their immediate affective value only, remaining
oblivious to situations' concomitant information value.
In this sense, implicit motives bear resemblance to
classical psychodynamic formulations of the id (Freud,
1933), which seeks pleasure in the here-and-now and is
unconcerned with

the personal and social implications of

behavior.
Implicit motives' affective representational code, as
well as their residence in psychic strata outside the
bounds of conscious reflection, colors their domain of
behavioral influence, associated behavioral incentives,
and proposed developmental origins.

As already alluded,

implicit motives do not affect all behavior, but only a
certain class of behavior.

Specifically, implicit motives

influence operant, or spontaneous, behavior (McClelland et
al., 1989).

Operant behaviors are responses that occur in

the absence of any detectable external stimuli and hence
appear to be spontaneous in the sense of ''unelicited" or
''autonomously initiated" (McClelland, 1980); the operantly
behaving individual appears to be operating-on the
environment rather than responding-to it.

By virtue of

their autonomous qualities, implicitly motivated behaviors
are more evident in behavior trends extended over time
than in immediate, circumscribed behavioral episodes.
This truism was even noted by Skinner (1938), who
recommended that operant behaviors be measured in terms of

13

frequency of response over time rather than in terms of
intensity of response to a known stimulus (McClelland et

al., 1989).

Implicit motives yield a thematic coherence

to the full net of behaviors that an individual initiates
over time.

As such, they can be likened to internal

navigation systems that guide the individual's behavioral
course when external signposts, in the form of
environmental initiatives, social expectations, and social
constraints are absent.
While it is true that implicitly motivated behaviors
occur in the absence of external elicitors, this is not to
say that they occur in the absence of any form of
incentive.

To the contrary, Koestner and McClelland

(1990) assert that implicit motives are responsive to
task-related, or behavioral, incentives, where behavior

and reward are intimately intertwined.

More specifically,

the pleasure in implicitly-motivated behavior is a natural
by-product of the behaving itself, coming from the "doing"
rather than from the "having done."

In this sense,

implicit motivation bears similarity to intrinsic
motivation (Deci & Ryan, 1980), which occurs when an
individual becomes "absorbed in an activity because of its
inherent qualities, such as its interest value or level of
challenge" (Koestner & McClelland, 1990, p. 532).
However, while the incentive for all intrinsically
motivated activities is purported to be a sense of
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competence and self-determination that accompanies action
(Deci & Ryan, 1985), the behavioral incentives associated
with various implicitly motivated activities are much more
varied (e.g., feeling competent, feeling powerful, feeling
close, etc.).
The incentives for implicit behavior can also be
understood as pleasurable, "innately triggered affective
experiences" (McClelland et al., 1989, p. 697) that
accompany motive-relevant experiences and behaviors.
Actually, two studies have supported the framing of
implicit incentives as ''hard-wired," internallyadministered emotional rewards.

Individuals high in n

Power evidence a greater release of norepinephrine than
others when exposed to an impactful experience
(McClelland, Ross, & Patel, 1985), and only people high in

n Affiliation show increased dopamine release when viewing
romantic films (McClelland, 1989); both norepinephrine
(Olds, 1977) and dopamine (Wise, 1980} have previously
been linked to pleasure and reinforcement.
A final defining feature of implicit motives concerns
their proposed developmental origins.

Implicit motives

are built upon a foundation of early, prelinguistic
affective experiences (McClelland et al., 1989).

Motive

formation is thought to follow from the interaction of
nature with nurture, whereby the individual's innate
incentive proclivities (i.e., some people are
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psychologically, or even biologically, wired to find
dominating, doing better, or being close more pleasurable
than others) are either activated or left dormant in early
dealings with significant others.

To the degree that the

infant is exposed to motive-relevant interpersonal
experiences, a consistent motive disposition will
crystallize around the repeated experiencing of the innate
behavioral incentive.

Implicit motive predispositions are

converted into formal motive dispositions, then, via
repeated affective arousal (McClelland et al., 1989).
It is presumed that motive predispositions that are not
aroused via interpersonal experience (e.g., the infant
with a strong proclivity to find closeness pleasurable
who is raised in an icy, aloof family atmosphere)
remain as latent motivational potentials in the adult.
Rather than being ephemeral precursors to a verbalconceptual motivational system, implicit motives comprise
a distinct, stable motivational setup that operates
throughout the individual's lifespan.

As an interesting

sidenote, it is speculated that implicit motives, as
outlined above, could conceivably develop in animals as
well as in humans.

McClelland et al.

(1989), for example,

note that since they are
built on direct experiences of affect also
characteristic of animals ... it should be possible for
implicit motives like n Achievement and n Power to
develop in animals without language, so long as the
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species responds to the natural incentives on which
these motives are based.
(p. 698)
Implicit motives, in fact, have been linked to the
workings of basic midbrain structures that both humans and
animals possess (McClelland, 1987a).
Self-attributed motives comprise a second,
developmentally more advanced motivational system that
is divorced from the implicit system's grounding in basic
affective reactions and (perhaps) animal heritage.
Self-attributed motives rely upon a verbal-conceptual
representational code.

In other words, actions and

experiences are perceived abstractly and linguistically
rather than experientially and viscerally.
attributed motives are, in fact,

Self-

intimately related to the

self-image, or the set of individual beliefs as to who one
is, who one would like to be, and how one is supposed to
behave.

When the individual apprehends experience through

the spectacles of self-attributed motives, experience is
understood in terms of its relevance to this image
rather than felt in terms of its immediate affective
weight (Raynor & McFarlin, 1986).

Self-Attributed

motives' operational mode also involves self-awareness.
Indeed, self-attributed motives are related to a
representation of reality that is detached, selfconscious, and decidedly evaluative--to an orientation
toward self-as-object rather than toward behaving-assubject.

An interesting result of this defining
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involvement of consciousness is that self-attributed
motives can only exert their influences under situations
where the individual has become self-aware, or egoinvolved (deCharms, 1968).

As long as the person is in a

state of task involvement, or "absorbed in an activity
because of its inherent qualities" (Koestner & McClelland,
1990, p. 532), self-attributed motives are in a sense
inert.

If, however, one should become aware of the

implications of an activity for one's intrapsychic (i.e.,
self-esteem) or interpersonal (i.e., social reputation)
standing, then self-attributed motives will become active.
In summary, then, self-attributed motives comprise a
verbal-conceptual "'self-system,' which requires
phenomenal awareness and is motivated to maximize
positive value regarding one's self-image" (Koestner &
McClelland, 1990, p. 542).
Self-attributed motives are clearly more abstract and
experience-distant than implicit motives, allying
themselves with verbally-represented answers to the
questions, "Who am I," "Who is it good to be?," and "Who
would I like to be?"

This is not to say, however, that

self-attributed motives are detached cognitive entities
with no behavior-determining firepower;

like any motive,

self-attributed motives do energize, direct, and select a

certain class of behavior.

Specifically, self-attributed

motives govern respondent behavior, or behavior that
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occurs in the presence of clear external elicitors.

Where

the operantly behaving individual appears to generate
behavior from within, the respondently behaving individual
seems to react.

By virtue of their dependence of external

elicitation, san-derived behaviors are manifest as
fleeting behavioral episodes rather than as sustained
behavioral trends.

Self-attributed motives, for example,

are especially predictive of choice behavior, or behavior
involving "immediate specific responses to specific
situations" (McClelland et al., 1989, p. 691).

A second

reason for self-attributed motives' lack of relationship
to more sustained behavioral trends concerns the
invocation of self-consciousness that is a prerequisite to
their activity.

Since self-consciousness itself is more

of a fleeting, often socially-induced state than a stable
phenomenal trait, it follows that the behavioral
expression of self-attributed motive dispositions would
have a similarly episodic nature.
Where the incentives associated with implicit motives
are task-intrinsic, the incentives pertaining to selfattributed motives are decidedly social.

Self-Attributed

motives' incentives, paradoxically, have nothing to do
with specific motive content:

individuals high in san

Power do not necessarily enjoy feeling powerful more than
others, and people high in san Intimacy do not
particularly enjoy closeness.

Instead, the incentive for
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san motive-derived behavior is the same regardless of the
particular motive.

Specifically, people high in a given

self-attributed motive behave for the sake of identity
confirmation and/or impression management.

The former

incentive involves a sense of intrapsychic congruence, in
which the individual perceives personal behavior as being
consistent with personal expectations.

The latter

incentive involves a sense of social competence, whereby a
desired self-image has been effectively communicated to
others, and the individual has responded correctly to
perceived social demands and expectations.

Along these

lines, Koestner and McClelland (1990) note:
rather than cherishing the process of performing an
activity, extrinsically oriented people (i.e., sanmotivated people) behave as they believe they are
supposed to.
Instead of being associated with
interest, (self-attributed motivation) is likely to
be associated with feelings of pressure and tension.
(p. 543)

Actually, it is quite conceivable that the emotional
component to san behavior's reward is the decrement in
tension that follows successful self-presentation or
identity confirmation.
Since self-attributed motives are inextricably meshed
with more developmentally advanced verbal-conceptual
phenomena, it makes sense that they should develop
somewhat later than do implicit motives.

Self-attributed

motives develop only after the individual "can comprehend
linguistic communication and organize its meanings into

20

such constructs as self, others, and social norms''
(McClelland et al., 1989, p. 699).

Rather than through

affective arousal, as in the case of implicit motives,
self-attributed motives are acquired through a process of
cognitive assimilation, whereby the individual
internalizes the explicit, often verbal, teachings of
significant others and of society.

In particular, self-

attributed motives are grounded in early teachings as to
what values and goals one should pursue, or what
motivational traits are good for the self.

Along with the

content of such teachings, the individual presumably
internalizes the significant other's positive reactions to
motive-consistent behaviors, such that subsequent motivedriven behaviors are imbued with a positive evaluative
overtone.
Research on Implicit and Self-Attributed Motives
This section is concerned with the empirical basis
for the just-outlined distinctions between implicit and
self-attributed motives.

Although no studies to date have

explicitly addressed the distinction between motives based
on operational mode, numerous studies have examined the
distinctions concerning class of behavior influenced,
motive-related incentives, and developmental origins.
While Chapter Four will address motive research as it
bears upon the construct validity of specific,
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circumscribed motives and motive measures, the present
discussion is concerned with research on specific motives
only as it pertains to a more general theory of implicit
and self-attributed motivation.

In this spirit, special

attention will be given to those studies that include both
implicit and self-attributed motive variables and thus
permit a direct comparison of the two motive types'
effects.
Domain of behavioral influence.

Over the years, a

substantial body of data has been amassed supporting the
idea that implicit motives predict trends in operant
behavior over time (McClelland, 1980).

An individual's

level of intimacy motivation at age 30, for example,
has been shown to predict marital happiness and
psychosocial adjustment at age 47 (McAdams & Vaillant,
1982).

Similarly,

n Achievement, assessed during college,

has predicted employment in small business years after
graduation (McClelland, 1965) as well as number of
promotions in a large company over a three-year span
(Andrews, 1967) and in another over a 16 year period
(McClelland & Boyatzis, 1982).

The implicit "leadership

motive pattern," a combination of average or above-average

n

Power that also exceeds level of

n

Affiliation and is

accompanied by high self control, has been shown to
significantly predict off ice holding in voluntary
organizations 14 years after motive assessment (Winter,
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McClelland, & Stewart, 1981).
While self-attributed motives have at times appeared
to predict operant behavior as well, examination of
specific studies reveals a proneness to alternate
interpretations and/or an inability to establish the
temporal precedence of the self-attributed motive
disposition (Calder & Ross, 1973; McClelland et al., 1989;
Mischel, 1968; Schuman & Johnson, 1976).

For example,

well-respected self-attributed motive scales, such as
those included in Jackson's (1984) Personality Research
Form (PRF), often employ peer rating-motive scale
correlations as their sole demonstration of scale scores'
relation to long-term trends in behavior (e.g., Jackson,
1984; Paunonen, 1979).

It is assumed in such studies that

peer ratings reflect peers' simple observance of long-term
trends in an individual's behavior.

This assumption,

however, is of questionable accuracy.

It is quite

possible that people who see themselves as possessing a
certain motive orientation communicate these opinions
about themselves to peers via conversations, etc; these
peers may then only be dutifully reiterating subjects'
relatively explicit self-descriptions in filling-out peer
rating forms (McClelland, 1972, 1980).

As a second

example, Kreitler and Kreitler (1976) purported to have
demonstrated the ability of san Achievement-like
constructs to predict final grades.

Examination of the
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study, however reveals that achievement orientation
correlated with grades received during the prior academic
year, and hence, it is just as likely that grades
predicted subsequent self-reported achievement
orientation.

In summary, then, there is little evidence

that self-attributed motives predict extended trends in
spontaneous behavior.
There is, on the other hand, a good deal of evidence
that constructs similar to self-attributed motives predict
immediate responses to externally-defined situations
(McClelland, 1980).

For example, subjects' self-reported

behavioral intents (i.e., a more circumscribed version of
their self-attributed motives) for an immediately upcoming
Prisoner's Dilemma game correlate highly with subsequent
behavioral choices made in the game (Ajzen & Fishbein,
1970).

On a more general level, Bandura (1982), in

reviewing a number of confirmatory studies, concluded that
judgments of self-efficacy in a specific domain of
functioning strongly predict subsequent performance in the
domain.

Kreitler and Kreitler (1976), furthermore,

found

that childrens' self-attributed level of curiosity is
significantly correlated with curious behaviors in an
explicitly-defined testing situation; "explicitlydefined," in this case means that potential curious
behaviors were defined for children as such prior to
testing.

In summarizing

findings such as these, Azjen
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and Fishbein (1970) caution that ''the longer the time
interval between the statement of intention (i.e., the.
assessment of the san-like construct) and the actual
behavior, the lower the correlation between intent and
behavior will tend to be" (p. 469).

San-like constructs

are most predictive of behavior when construct and
criterion evidence a high degree of

co~respondence

(Azjen

& Fishbein, 1977), such that (1) self-reported construct
and behavior are similar in level of specificity, and (2)
the time lag between motive assessment and behavioral
criterion is minimal.
Unlike self-attributed motives, implicit motives do
not generally predict behavior in situations characterized
by a high degree of externally-provided structure or
definition (Koestner & McClelland, 1990).

As a case in

point, the introduction of controlling external
contingencies has repeatedly been found to dampen n
Achievement's behavior-predicting power .. Andrews (1967)
found that

while n Achievement predicted work performance

in a less-constraining work environment, these motive
effects did not hold in a second work environment
characterized by a more authoritarian, controlling
organizational structure.

Similarly, the imposition of an

explicit competitive goal structure has been shown to
eliminate performance differences between individuals high
and low in n Achievement (Gresko & Morgenstern, 1974).

It
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is proposed that external structurings precipitate a shift
from operant to respondent behavioral modes, with a
corresponding shift in activation from implicit to selfattributed motivational systems (Koestner & McClelland,
1990) .
While there is a plethora of studies that either link
implicit motives to operant behaviors or self-attributed
motives to respondent behaviors, there are precious few
that include both (1) implicit and self-attributed motive
measures and (2) operant and respondent behavioral
criteria.

In the first of these more definitive studies,

Constantian (as reported in McClelland, 1985) gave college
students both implicit (i.e., TAT) and self-attributed
(i.e., self-report) measures of the affiliative motive,
which is defined as a recurrent preference for
establishing, maintaining, and restoring warm
interpersonal relationships (Atkinson, Heyns, & Veroff,
1954; Boyatzis, 1973).

Subsequent to motive measurement,

subjects' affiliative behavior in both operant and
respondent domains was assessed.

The operant measure

involved an experience sampling approach, where subjects
wearing pagers were beeped randomly and repeatedly over a
number of days.

Upon each paging, subjects were

instructed to describe what they had been doing
immediately prior to paging, among other things.

Operant

affiliative behavior, in this case, was operationalized as
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the number of random pagings for which a subject was found
talking with someone.

In contrast to the operant

behavioral criterion, which left subjects' behavior
unconstrained and assessed behavioral trends extended in
time, the respondent criterion tapped immediate
affiliative choice behavior.

Specifically, subjects were

asked to choose between pairings of affiliative and
nonaffiliative behavioral alternatives (e.g., living with
roommates versus living alone; seeing a film with someone
versus seeing a film alone, etc.).

As would be predicted,

n Affiliation correlated more robustly with the operant
behavioral criterion than did san Affiliation, while san
Affiliation was more highly related to affiliative choice
behavior than was n Affiliation.
A second study conducted by Heckhausen and Halisch
(1986) also supports the connection of implicit and selfattributed motives to distinct behavioral domains.

In

this case, the focal construct was achievement motivation,
defined as "a concern with doing things better, with
surpassing standards of excellence" (McClelland et al.,
1953, p. 228).

As in the previous study, implicit and

self-attributed measures of this general motive content
evidenced different behavioral correlates.

Subjects'

level of n Achievement predicted the successful
initiation of job-related activities in the absence of
explicit external guidelines.

Where

n

Achievement
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predicted spontaneous behavioral trends, san Achievement
was related both to setting high aspirational levels and
to rating oneself as high in ability level on various
questionnaires.

Hence, san Achievement's net of

correlates involved immediate choice behavior (i.e.,
choosing an aspiration level from a list of alternatives)
and subjects' thoughts about themselves, or verbal selfimage (i.e., attributing a high level of achievement
traits to oneself}.
Biernat (1989) has also reported a study that bears
on the topic under discussion.

Following assessment of

both n Achievement and san Achievement, subjects were
given the Wendt (1955) mental arithmetic task and were
also asked about their willingness to serve as an
organizer or leader on a subsequent task.

Performance on

the arithmetic task, which involves little mathematical
ability but much mental effort, was seen as an operant
criterion:

Biernat (1989) comments:

although there is an experimental demand to perform,
how well subjects perform; how much effort and
persistence they put into the task, are not dependent
on any particular cue, but rather depend on the
inclination of the subject for whom numerous
behaviors are possible (e.g., concentrating very
hard, letting the mind wander, setting a very low or
a very high goal).
(pp. 6-7)
The question regarding willingness to lead, on the other
hand, represents a respondent criterion, in that subjects
are presented with a highly-structured stimulus (i.e., the
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question) that, by social convention, implies clear
response alternatives (i.e. , answering "Yes" or "No") . . As
hypothesized, n Achievement predicted performance on the
arithmetic task while being unrelated to responses to the
leadership question.

Conversely, san Achievement related

positively to "Yes" responses on the leadership question
while failing to relate to arithmetic performance.
Although there is perhaps some question as to an
externally-imposed mental arithmetic task's viability as a
"pure" measure of operant behavior, these results,
considered in tandem with those of Constantian and of
Heckhausen and Halisch offer support for the contention
that implicit and self-attributed motives exert their
influences in distinct behavioral domains.
Associated incentives.

Four definitive experiments

have sought to differentiate implicit from self-attributed
motives based on the former's relation to behavioral
incentives and the latter's to social incentives.

For the

first two of these, Koestner, Weinberger, McClelland, and
Healy {1988) assessed subjects' levels of n Achievement,
via the TAT, and san Achievement, via the PRF.

All

subjects next participated in an associate memory task
(Experiment One) followed by a word-finding puzzle task
(Experiment Two).

In the memory task, subjects were

assigned to either no-incentive or social-incentive
conditions; in the latter condition, an experimenter
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repeatedly mentioned ways to improve word recall.

Stated

differently, the experimenter introduced a verbal framing
of the recall task as one with relevance to achievement.
While the recall task pitted a social-incentive condition
against a no-incentive condition, the second, puzzle task
simply varied the level of task difficulty.
high in n Achievement, the more

For subjects

difficult puzzles were

expected to provide a behavioral incentive (i.e., the
difficulty allows for an opportunity to feel a sense of
accomplishment and success not afforded by simple puzzles)
that would not be as germane for subjects low in
n Achievement.
A series of ANOVAS yielded confirmatory results in
both the memory-task and puzzle-task experiments.

In the

memory experiment, a significant condition X san
Achievement level interaction was obtained:

subjects high

in san achievement performed significantly better in the
presence of a social achievement incentive than did those
low in the motive, while they actually performed worse
than low-achievement subjects in the absence of a social
incentive.

No such relationships occurred in the first

experiment when subjects were divided into high- and low-n
Achievement groups; the performance of people high in
n Achievement was not affected by the presence of a social
incentive.

ANOVAs conducted in the second, puzzle-task

experiment reveal a significant difficulty X n Achievement
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level interaction, such that subjects high in

n Achievement showed relatively enhanced performance under
the difficult condition, while low-achievement subjects
showed the opposite pattern.

Level of san Achievement did

not interact with degree of difficulty in a significant
way.

Taken together, these results strongly support the

contention that implicit motives are tied to behavioral
incentives, or incentives embedded in doing the task,
while self-attributed motives are tied to social
incentives--at least in the case of achievement
motivation.
A third experiment (Koestner et al., 1988) has
examined the above types of relationships as they apply to
power motivation, which is defined as a "desire to have
impact on others by influencing, persuading, helping,
arguing with, or attacking them" (McClelland et al., 1989,
p. 694).

In this study, n Power was assessed using the

popular TAT method (Winter, 1973), while san Power was
assessed using the Dominance scale from Jackson's (1984)
PRF.

Following motive assessment, all subjects worked on

a social perception task (Sternberg, 1986), which involved
viewing a series of pictures of two people and determining
the relationship between the two for each picture.

For

half of the pictures, subjects were asked to judge the

power relationship in the dyad--to determine

which of the

two people was the boss over the other; for the remaining
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pictures, subjects judged the dyadic affiliative
relationship between the two people (e.g., lovers, friends,
etc.).

Hence, half of the pictures involved a

behavioral power incentive, while the other half featured
a behavioral incentive unrelated to power.

A further

methodological twist in this study involved the
introduction of a social power incentive to half of the
participants:

while half of the subjects were simply told

how to perform the social perception task, the others were
additionally told that performance on the task as a whole
(i.e., not just on the pictures involving power
relationships) was related to managerial and persuasive
abilities.
As with the experiments on achievement motivation,
this power-focused study yielded relevant, confirmatory
results.

First,

n Power was related to enhanced

performance on the power-related pictures only, and there
was no n__Power level by social incentive condition
interaction:

introduction of a social power incentive did

not differentially affect those high in
low in n Power.

n Power over those

Second, san Power did not predict a

relatively better performance on power-oriented pictures
than on affiliation-related pictures.

Subjects high in

san Power, in other words, evidenced no special
motivational investment in construing or processing powerrelated interpersonal scenarios.

San Power did, however,
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interact with social power incentive condition, such that
high-san Power participants performed better than low-san
power participants when the social incentive was
introduced.

Furthermore, this "social incentive effect"

held for power-related and affiliation-related pictures
alike.

For san-motivated individuals·, it seems, an

activity's relation to a motivational content is
irrelevant.

Instead, it is the explicit, verbal

association of any activity to the concept of "power,"
"achievement," etc. that causes an increased investment in
the activity.
In contrast to the last experiment, a final
experiment conducted by Koestner and Zuckerman (1989)
suggests that while san-motivated individuals are
apparently oblivious to the rewards inherent in different
types of activity, they are, unlike implicitly motivated
individuals, actually quite sensitive to fine distinctions
between social incentive types.

After assessing

n Achievement, n Power, san Achievement, and san Power in
the standard ways, Koestner and Zuckerman had participants
work on a word maze.

Subjects' work was interrupted by an

experimenter who gave each participant either achievementoriented performance feedback or power-related performance
feedback.

The achievement feedback focused on mastery, or

how much of the task a subject had completed, while the
power feedback focused on competition, or how well the
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subject was doing relative to others.

Following feedback,

participants were informed that the experiment was over
and were left to do as they pleased.

Their subsequent

persistence on the word maze task was then measured.

For

subjects high in san Achievement, a greater percentage
evidenced task persistence following mastery feedback than
did following competitive feedback.

In the case of

subjects high in san Power, the reverse was true:

more

subjects persisted following competitive feedback than did
following mastery feedback.

No such relationships were

obtained for subjects high in n Achievement or n Power.
While implicitly-motivated individuals are unaffected by
verbally-presented incentives, then, it appears that sanmotivated people respond to motive-consistent feedback
with an enhanced behavioral investment in the activity at
hand (i.e., the motive's energizing function).

The

combined results of the four experiments just discussed
allow for at least some preliminary validation of the
contention that implicit motives are tied to behavioral
incentives while self-attributed motives are linked with
social incentives.
Developmental origins.

The evidence for the

grounding of implicit and self-attributed motives in
different sorts of developmental experiences is limited to
a single longitudinal study conducted by McClelland and
Pilon (1983).

When the study's participants were five
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years old, their mothers were exhaustively interviewed on
their child-rearing practices.

Twenty-six years later,

the participants were administered TAT measures of n
Achievement, n Power, and n Affiliation and Adjective
checklist (Gough & Heilbrun, 1983) measures of these three
constructs' self-attributed counterparts.

Analysis of

relationships between specific child-rearing practices and
adult motivational constitution revealed a number of
significant correlations.

In the domain of achievement

motivation, n Achievement correlated positively with
regularly scheduled feeding and with the severity of
toilet training, while san Achievement correlated with
early task setting by parents.

McClelland et al.

(1989)

reason that these findings are consistent with implicit
motives' proposed grounding in early, prelinguistic
affective experiences and self-attributed motives' basis
in explicit, verbal dealings with significant others.
First, toilet training was typically completed during the
first 19 months of life for this cohort, such that lingual
comprehension would not have permitted a predominantly
verbal coding of the experience.

Additionally, teaching a

child to master hunger states through scheduled feeding
certainly involves less verbal-conceptual interchange than
does explicitly outlining the tasks that a child is to
perform.

It is proposed, then that parental rigor in the

areas of feeding and toilet training simply provided
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children with more opportunities to experience the
pleasure inherent in mastering internal states.

The

setting of early tasks to master, on the other hand, was
more aligned with verbal-conceptual structuring (i.e.,
explicitly outlining the achievement task) and extrinsic,
more abstract rewards (i.e., verbalized praise).
McClelland and Pilon also garnered relevant results
in the case of power motivation.

Here, parental

permissiveness around sexual and aggressive play predicted
adult n Power.

"Permissiveness" in this case can be

equated with parents' allowing or ignoring behavior
(McClelland et al., 1989); hence, it appears that implicit
motive development was encouraged by the parental
provision of a nondirective environment--one that allowed
for the child's unconstrained and repeated experiencing of
the pleasures attendant to having impact on others.

In

the case of san Power, both punishment of aggression
directed at parents and frequency of mother-administered
spankings were predictive of adult motive strength.
McClelland et al.

(1989) frame these relationships as

confirmatory, noting that "spanking and punishment for
aggression are usually accompanied by explicit statements
forbidding the child to do something and explaining why he
or she is being spanked for violating a prohibition" (pp.
699-700).

The researchers contend that it is the child's

internalization of the verbal accompaniments to the
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punishments that facilitates san motive development.
While this explanation seems somewhat plausible, it does
not explain the relationship of san motive development to
punishment.

It is plausible that the san motive develops

through an identification with the aggressor--with the
parents' display of power.

However, a bevy of equally

plausible, theory-inconsistent explanations are also
available.

It is, for example, possible that a self-

attributed desire to dominate develops as a compensation
for early experiences of being dominated by more powerful
others.
The results for the affiliative motives are, like
those for power motivation, inconsistently conclusive.
The sole significant correlate of adult n Affiliation was
a lack of maternal responsiveness to the infant's crying,
while adult san Affiliation was related to mothers'
repeated teachings that the child should "not fight back."
The latter finding is quite supportive:

explicit parental

teachings that one should be nice and not fight predict
the development of affiliative self-constructs as tapped
by a self-ascriptive affiliative questionnaire.

The

finding for n Affiliation, however, is less clear.

It can

be speculated that children who were allowed to suffer
longer prior to receiving maternal attention experienced a
more strong positive affective reaction when the contact
did finally arrive; repeated experiencings of this
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distress-followed-by-interpersonal-relief scenario could
lay the affective-experiential groundwork for motive
development.

However, alternate explanations of this

finding are clearly possible.

McClelland et al.,

(1989)

actually diverge from their own theory of implicit motive
acquisition in interpreting this finding, suggesting that

n Affiliation may have it's affective genesis in feelings
of anxiety rather than in pleasurable affective
experiences.

Specifically, they contend that early

experiences of insecurity in the maternal relationship
crystallize into an "implicit fear of rejection"
(McClelland et al., 1989, p. 700), which persists into
adulthood and is related to n Affiliation (Koestner &
McClelland, 1990).
In conclusion, only a few partially supportive
findings have related implicit and self-attributed motives
with specific, distinct developmental origins.

Some of

the relationships obtained by McClelland and Pilon (1983)
are compelling, as in the linkings of parental
permissiveness to adult n Power and of explicit
instructions to "not fight back" to adult
san Affiliation.

It is also noteworthy that in no case

did an implicit motive and a self-attributed motive share
a parenting correlate; the two motive types do appear to
have distinct developmental roots.

These immediately

convincing findings, however, are accompanied by a series
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of less conclusive results--results less readily
assimilable by McClelland et al's,
propositions.

(1989) developmental

Furthermore, both the compelling and less

compelling explanations advanced for obtained
relationships are all post-hoc.

Clearly, more research

must occur in this area before more definitive conclusions
can be reached.
Measurement of Implicit and Self-Attributed Motives
Operant and respondent measures.

The previously-

discussed functional differences between implicit and
self-attributed motives influence the types of measures
used to assess them.

Not surprisingly, self-attributed

motives are best-assessed by respondent measures, which
sample choice behavior under highly-structured, explicit
situations (McClelland, 1980).

Two of the most widely

used respondent measures of self-attributed motives are
Jackson's (1984) Personality Research Form (PRF) and Gough
and Heilbrun's (1980) Adjective Check List (ACL).

The

former requires the test-taker.to respond "True" or
"False" to a number of self-statements (e.g., "I am quite
effective in getting others to agree with me"), while the
latter simply asks the test-taker to endorse or not
endorse a series of potentially self-descriptive
adjectives.

As exemplified by the PRF and ACL, respondent

measures generally constrain the test-taker, specifying

39

both the stimulus, in this case a test question, and the
range of possible responses to the stimulus.

They also

engender "consistency and social desirability sets"
(McClelland, 1980, p. 36), asking how the subject
generally feels or generally is.

In fact, some have

cautioned that respondent questionnaires may tap
self-presentations rather than self-reports (Hogan &
Nicholson, 1988).
Unlike self-attributed motives, implicit motives are
best-assessed via operant measures, or instruments that
sample spontaneously-generated, unconstrained behavior
(McClelland, 1980).

The most popular operant measures in

implicit motive research involve the Thematic Apperception
Test (TAT):

subjects are asked to tell imaginative

stories to pictures of vague interpersonal scenarios.
These stories (i.e., samples of operant behavior) are then
rigorously scored for the presence of various motiverelated themes.

In the case of

n Intimacy, for example,

subjects' imaginative stories are scored for thematic
categories such as Dialogue, Commitment or Concern, and
Harmony (McAdams, 1979).

Operant measures, unlike

respondent instruments, provide little in the way of
explicit task structure.

In other words, there is no

specific test question and no specific set of responses;
the test-taker operates on the test, rather than
responding to it.

Operant measures also leave the social
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implications accompanying various responses undefined.
The comparative absence of explicitly-defined social
meanings, in turn, allows for a relative circumvention of
self-conscious processing.

McClelland et al.

(1989), for

example, note, "the imaginative stories from which
implicit motives are coded reflect motivational and
emotional themes in the person's life, unevaluated as to
their appropriateness in terms of concepts of the self,
others, and what is important" (p. 698).

Operant measures

are finally distinguished from respondent measures based
on the response sets that they encourage.

Rather than

consistency sets, operant measures create variability
sets, or tacit demands for variable responding, via
instructions that emphasize imagination and creativity
(McClelland, 1980).
Reliability issues.

The most biting criticisms of

TAT motive measures involve their reliability, estimates
of which typically reside well below the range accepted by
traditional psychometric criteria.

Entwisle (1972), for

example, in an analysis of both published and unpublished
TAT n Achievement data, estimated the measure's
homogeneity reliability (i.e., internal consistency) to
reside in the .30 to .40 range.

Similarly low estimates

have been obtained for various TAT measures' test-retest
reliabilities, which range from an K of .10 to .35
(McClelland, 1980).

These psychometric shortcomings are
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brought into even sharper relief by comparisons with wellestablished self-report motive measures.

The ACL scales

for san Achievement, san Power, and san Affiliation, for
example, boast internal consistencies of .84, .79, and
.88, and test-retest reliabilities of .73, .76, and .63,
respectively (Gough & Heilbrun, 1983).
In examining reliability issues in motive
measurement, McClelland (1980) has argued that the
reliability figures associated with self-report motive
measures are spuriously inflated.

There are at least four

ways through which motive questionnaires, rather than the
constructs they tap, may pull for exaggerated reliability
coefficients.

First, the instructions accompanying most

self-report measures communicate an implicit consistency
demand through instructions like "answer honestly," and
"state your true feelings."

These sorts of guidelines

discourage possible construct-driven inconsistencies,
allying contradictory responses with concepts of
"dishonesty" and "wishy-washiness."

Second, self-report

measures often tap generalized response sets in addition
to the targeted motive construct.

These sets can lead to

consistently_positive or negative responses regardless of
item content (Edwards, 1957; Couch & Keniston, 1960).
Third, self-report measures gain non construct-related
consistency by
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asking the same question in many different
ways ... as D'Andrade (1965) has demonstrated, there is
so much semantic overlap among the adjectives used
in different descriptions that the subjects cannot
really discriminate what is being asked. They are
answering the same question, semantically speaking,
over and over again, and it is the psychologist who
has been fooled into thinking that he has established
response consistency, when the subject cannot tell
one stimulus from another.
(McClelland, 1980, p. 32)
A final contributor to self-report measures' inflated
reliabilities is their frequent inclusion of questions
concerning past behavior.

Unless the subject blatantly

malingers, it is doubtful that responses will change, even
if the construct targeted by the question has.

McClelland

{1980) concludes, "The most reasonable inference to be
made from these facts is that the true reliability of
characteristics measured in the usual type of personality
questionnaires ... is unknown" (p.31).
While there is evidence that reliability estimates
are spuriously high in the case of self-report measures,
there is actually reason to believe that reliability
estimates for TAT motive measures are artificially
deflated.

Standard TAT instructions prime subjects to be

creative and imaginative.

To the degree that a subject

heeds these instructions, it is improbable that a series
of consecutive stories will address the same thematic
content, even if there is an implicit-motive press for
thematic repetition.

There is nothing creative or

original about copying one's own stories.

In fact, a
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"sawtooth effect" has been identified in TAT achievement
stories (Atkinson, 1950):

it is normative for

consecutively written TAT stories to alternate between a
relative presence and relative absence of achievement
themes.

Notably, the test-retest reliability estimates

associated with TAT measures improve substantially when
creativity sets are eliminated through altered
instructions.

Winter and Stewart (1977), for example,

told subjects not to worry about similarities between
previously written TAT stories and stories written on a
second TAT administration.

They obtained a test-retest

coefficient of .58 for n Power.

Comparable effects have

been reported in the case of n Achievement (Heckhausen,
Schmalt, & Schneider, 1985) and n Intimacy (Lundy, 1980).
The just-discussed measure-based explanations for
operant and respondent measures' discrepant reliabilities
are supplemented by construct-based explanations.

In

particular, presses toward consistency are probably
inherent in the self-attributed motive system itself
(Guidano & Liotti, 1983).

Subjects may attach consistency

demands to respondent self-report tasks, then, even in the
absence of bias-fostering instructions.

Furthermore,

self-attributed motives are intimately linked with social
presentation.

Hence, it somewhat befits the construct

that self-presentational factors should influence test
scores.

In conclusion, some of the factors that
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McClelland (1980) frames as reliability-inflating
measurement artifacts may actually be indigenous aspects
of self-attributed motives.

This argument, however, only

applies to some of McClelland's criticisms.

Implicit

consistency demands and generalized response sets may be
"in the motive" rather than "in the measure."

On the

other hand, self-report measures' inclusion of
semantically interchangeable items and use of past-focused
questions certainly reflect unwanted measure-based bias.
There are also theory-based reasons why implicit
motive measures should not exhibit high reliabilities.
McClelland (1980) asserts that implicit motives function
according to an alternative manifestations model.
The crux of this idea is that implicit motives, to the
extent that they express themselves one way in a
behavioral episode, will be less apt to express themselves
in another way at that time.

To the extent that

n Power

is expressed by telling a TAT story about an argument, for
example, there will be less of a press to tell a
relational exploitation story to another TAT card.
In other words, "the alternative manifestations are not
highly intercorrelated as the consistency hypothesis
assumes they should be" (McClelland, 1980, p. 32).

The

varying of operant responses (i.e., alternation behavior)
is furthermore assumed by general behavior theory to have
both adaptive value and evolutionary basis; behavioral
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variability may be hard-wired into the implicit system.
In fact, Atkinson (1981) has argued that phenotypic
expressions of unobservable, genotypic implicit motive
dispositions are systematically inconsistent, rather than
random and incoherent.
A final construct-based reason for TAT motive
measures' low reliability concerns the dimension of
sensitivity.

Implicit motives are proposed to be

extremely sensitive to fluctuations in internal and
situational states.

The influences of such uncontrollable

factors as random daily events, reactions to the
experimenter and other subjects, mood during test
administration, and degree of recent motive satisfaction
all interact with stable motive dispositions to yield
obtained motive scores.

In other words, there is a

relatively low "signal to noise ratio" when TAT measures
are used to assess stable motivational traits.

It is

worth mentioning that this is not the case with the
measurement of self-attributed motives.

To the degree

that the subject is a stable, well-integrated person,
daily fluctuations in internal and external environments
will not precipitate marked fluctuations in the selfimage.

Furthermore, self-report measures' concern with

how subjects generally behave or generally feel helps
preclude extraneous influences.
McClelland has argued passionately that estimates of
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TAT measures' reliabilities are spuriously deflated while
reliability values for self-report motive measures are_
inflated.

Cogent speculation, however, must not be

confused with empirical support:

McClelland and his

associates have offered no empirical evidence that selfreport measures' reliability suffers when certain
measurement artifacts are removed.

It may well be that

both measure types' "true" reliabilities reside in the
moderate range.

Nonetheless, it is equally probable that

when all measurement artifacts are removed, questionnaire
motive measures are still more reliable instruments than
TAT motive measures.

In fact,

it is theoretically

warranted to expect that even with the elimination of all
confounds, respondent measures are more reliable than
operant instruments.

This follows from the self-

attributed system's alliance with consistency and self
presentation, as well as the implicit system's tendencies
toward sensitivity and behavioral alternation.
Validity issues.

TAT motive measures, particularly

the TAT measure for n Achievement, have also been
criticized on validity grounds (Entwisle, 1972; Klinger,
1966).

Indeed TAT-assessed motive studies are prone to

inconsistently supportive findings and to difficulties
with replication (McClelland, 1980).

Klinger (1966), for

example, concluded that n Achievement "scores are shown to
be correlated with performance measures in (only) about
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l/2 of the studies reported" (p. 291).

In defending the

validity of TAT motive measures, McClelland (1980) invokes
their aforementioned sensitivity, which is actually
desirable from a construct validity perspective, as a
major contributor to variable findings.

Due to implicit

motives' sensitivity, TAT studies are much more prone than
questionnaire studies to situational interferences.
McClelland (1980) cautions, "much more care must be taken
when operant measures are used to insure that testing
conditions are standardized, neutral with regard to
arousing cues, and the same for all subjects tested" (p.
35).

Without such care, he asserts, experimental

lackluster will masquerade as validational deficit.

While

McClelland's argument again makes sense, it is also a
particularly convenient "escape hatch" for nonsupportive
findings:

whenever TAT measures fail to predict a

behavioral criterion, spurious, unnoticed situational
factors can be retrospectively identified.
Entwisle (1972), in a particularly damaging critique,
has also condemned the TAT measure of n Achievement on the
grounds that it does not often predict academic
performance.

This appraisal does seem misguided, in that

grades are not an apt validity criterion:

a

straightforward relationship between n Achievement and
something as multi-determined as school performance has
never been posited by motive researchers.

McClelland et
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al.

(1953), in fact, explicitly cautioned investigators

against expecting such a simple linear relationship from
the outset.

As it turns out, TAT-assessed

n

Achievement

does predict scholastic excellence, but only when certain
achievement fostering situational elements are present,
i.e., autonomy-supportive context, provision of moderate
challenge, frequent performance feedback (Koestner &
McClelland, 1990; McKeachie, 1961; O'Connor, Atkinson, &
Horner, 1966).

In other situations, n Power and even n

Affiliation have been found to predict academic success
(McKeachie, 1961).
While operant motive measures suffer from erratic
relationships to validational criteria, McClelland (1980)
contends that respondent motive measures suffer from
consistent covariance with criteria of only questionable
worth.

Popular self-report motive measures typically cite

three types of validity data.

These involve correlations

between the measure of interest and (1) scores on
instruments measuring similar constructs,

(2) behaviors

specifically covered by the questionnaire, and (3) peer
ratings (Scott & Johnson, 1972).

All three of these

sources are problematic in that they allow ample
opportunity for predictor-criterion contamination, and
hence, foster spuriously inflated validity estimates
(McClelland, 1980).

In the case of the first validity

source, criterion scales often share items with the
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predictor scale, in addition to sharing (desirable)
conceptual similarity.

To the degree that item overlap

is responsible for obtained correlations, evidence of
reliability, but certainly not validity, is garnered.
In other words, predictor-criterion contamination has
occurred.

A similar problem occurs when a measure of an

abstract concept (e.g., san Power, san Intimacy) contains
items that specifically address a behavioral validity
criterion.

Consider the case, for example, where a power

measure containing the item, "I often find myself in
positions of power over others" is significantly
correlated with working as a manager:

this sort of

result, which essentially correlates something with
itself, does not provide particularly convincing validity
data.

Finally, obtained correspondences between self-

reports and peer ratings may reflect only the tendency of
peers to repeat statements that individuals make about
themselves in the context of ongoing social interaction
(McClelland, 1980).
In summary, it is possible that validity estimates
for operant measures are deflated due to an interaction
between construct sensitivity and uncontrolled
situational-experimental factors.

Validity estimates for

respondent motive measures, on the other hand, may be
somewhat inflated by measure-criterion contamination.
Story-based motive measures' perennial reputation as
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"black sheep" in the psychometric community is perhaps
somewhat justified.

However, closer examination of

questionnaire measures' probable "true" validities,
renders their validational superiority questionable.
Implicit and self-attributed variables are unrelated.
McClelland et al.

(1989) note that "measures of self-

attributed and implicit motives seldom correlate
significantly with one another," adding that "few facts in
psychology are as well established as this one" (p. 691).
This general finding was first reported by McClelland et
al.

(1953), who found an absence of significant

correlations between TAT and self-report measures of
achievement motivation.

This finding for achievement

motivation has been replicated many times over (e.g.,
Atkinson & Litwin, 1960; Heckhausen, 1980; Heckhausen &
Halisch, 1986, Holmes & Tyler, 1968).

The finding has

also been replicated in the cases of power motivation and
intimacy motivation (Hoffman, 1989), and only weak, barely
significant correlations have been obtained between TAT
and questionnaire-assessed affiliation motivation
(Constantian, 1982).

As a recent illustration, of

implicit and self-attributed constructs general lack of
relationship, Koestner et al.

(1988), in a two-experiment

study, found the following pattern of nonsignificant
correlations:

(a) the pairing of

n Achievement and san
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Achievement yielded correlation coefficients of -.21 and
.15; (b) the corresponding values of an

n

Power with san

Power correlation were .08 and .05; and finally,

(c) the

obtained n Affiliation with san Affiliation coefficients
were -.06 and -.08.

In this case, implicit motives were

assessed using the usual TAT measures while the selfattributed motives were assessed using PRF Achievement,
Dominance, and Affiliation scales (Jackson, 1984).
Four major explanations address the lack of
relationship between the two motive types.

Some contend

that there is really only one type of motive, and that the
two types of motive measure do not correlate because TAT
motive measures are psychometrically worthless (Entwisle,
1972; Campbell & Fiske, 1959).

Similarly, others have

contended that the problem lies in self-report motive
measures' faulty design (Raven, 1988).

In fact, many have

tried in vain to develop self-report motive measures,
particularly of achievement motivation, that relate
consistently to TAT motive measures (Edwards, 1954; Gough

& Heilbrun, 1983; Jackson, 1974; Kreitler & Kreitler,
1976; Raven, Molloy, & Corcoran, 1972).

A third

explanation grounded in measurement issues implicates
neither of the two measures as "the culprit."

As

underscored by Campbell and Fiske {1959), every test score
represents an amalgam of construct-related variance and
method-related variance.

It is possible, then, that TAT
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and self-report measures are both measuring the same
construct, but that their shared construct variance is
obscured by the contributions of extremely divergent
method variances.
Unlike the preceding three explanations for the
failure of TAT and self-report motive measures to
intercorrelate, the final explanation, which guides the
thrust of the present investigation, is grounded in
construct-related considerations.

Specifically, this

argument, as advanced by McClelland et al.

(1989), asserts

that there is no fatal methodological flaw in either selfreport or TAT motive measures.

Instead the measures do

not correlate because they tap qualitatively different
types of motives that are not necessarily in accord with
each other.

Koestner and McClelland (1990) reflect,

"another way to react to this lack of correlation ... is to
take it seriously, to insist that at a minimum,
psychologists should not call by the same name two
measures that do not correlate with each other" (p. 542).
Against this backdrop, many of the presumed psychometric
flaws in the measures (e.g., the TAT's low reliability,
self-reports' failure to predict long-term trends in
behavior, etc.) can be reframed as defining features of
the constructs they tap.

As already discussed, TAT

measures should not show high test-retest reliability,
since implicit motives are extremely sensitive to
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environmental arousal; self-report measures, by the same
token, should not predict long-term trends in behavior. in
most cases, as self-attributed motives are only aroused in
more circumscribed, socially-defined episodes.
Interactions Between Implicit and Self-Attributed Motives.
Theory and research.

To assert that implicit and

self-attributed motives comprise distinct motivational
layers which need not be in accord is not to say that the
two motive types do not interact.

In fact, dynamic

theorists such as Freud (1910) and Jung (1971) have gained
much of their behavior-describing firepower by

positing

conscious and unconscious psychic levels in dynamic
interplay.

McClelland et al.

(1989), perhaps following

the lead of earlier psychodynamic theorists, propose a
similar interplay between implicit and self-attributed
systems.

They comment:

In evolutionary terms, a conscious motivational
system has been built on top, so to speak, of a more
primitive motivational system. The evolutionary
advantage of such an arrangement is obvious because
the more primitive, automatic motivational system is
not well equipped to make plans or to set specific
goals that take into account contextual
circumstances ... self-attributed goals often serve to
guide implicit motives into specific channels.
(p. 699)
The self-attributed system, then, is framed as a realityoriented "brains" that directs the implicit system's raw,
behavior-driving and activity-sustaining "braun."
the implicit personality presses for a continuing

Where
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succession of intrinsic pleasures (i.e., "What would feel
good to do now?"), the self-attributed system mediates.
implicit motive expression, taking into account perceived
social constraints and incentives, as well as the
implications of various behaviors for the self-image.
Much as the psychodynamic ego sublimates unacceptable
wishes into ego- and superego-syntonic gestures, selfattributed motives are purported to channel implicit
motive expression along identity-consistent lines.

In

more cognitive terms, the self-attributed system serves as
a temporary override system to ongoing automatic
functioning, allowing the verbal mediation of behavior
vis-a-vis conscious motives and concerns (Bargh, 1984;
Buck, 1985).
A number of studies featuring achievement motivation
provide support for the general proposition that selfattributed motives mediate implicit motive expression.
Patten and White (1977), for example, found that subjects
in whom n Achievement had been aroused experimentally outperformed controls on a digit symbol task.

While the

researchers reported that san Achievement had no similar
effect on performance, McClelland (1985a), in a representation of the data, found that high san Achievement
was in fact related to enhanced performance, but only for
subjects high inn Achievement.

Biernat's (1989)

aforementioned study, which relied on "trait"
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n Achievement rather than "state" n Achievement,
replicates this finding.

Once again, an implicit motive

by self-attributed motive interaction was obtained, such

that san Achievement related to enhanced performance on an
operant mathematics task only for subjects high in

n Achievement.

In summary, it appears that conscious

commitments toward accomplishment are associated with an
enhanced ability to convert both situationally-aroused and
dispositional implicit achievement press into operant
performance.
French and Lesser's (1964) study on women and
achievement further illuminates the relationships between
implicit and self-attributed motives.

In this case,

n Achievement predicted different operant behaviors
depending on subjects' self-reported commitments to either
a domestic role (i.e., wife and mother) or a career.

For

the former, n Achievement correlated significantly with
doing better at a social task (i.e., generating a list of
ways to make friends upon moving to a new community),
while it was unrelated to performance on an academic task
(i.e., solving anagrams).

For career-oriented women, on

the other hand, the reverse pattern was obtained:

n

Achievement correlated significantly with excelling at the
academic task, while failing to relate to performance on
the social task.

Hence, san-like constructs seem to

channel implicit motive expression into identity-
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consistent operant domains while blocking motive
expression in identity-inconsistent areas.
Various results from Constantian's (1981) beeper
study generalize the findings of achievement-focused
studies to the domain of affiliation.

First,

n Affiliation predicted frequency of affiliative activity
in randomly-paged college students (K=.42), while
san Affiliation and affiliative skills did not
significantly predict the same criterion.

Affiliation's

predictive power, however, was boosted to an K of .60 when

n Affiliation, san Affiliation, and affiliative skills
were predictively combined via a multiple correlation
technique.

More decisively, self-reported interpersonal

orientation was found to mediate
correlates.

n

Affiliation's operant

For subjects with an explicit commitment to

affiliation (i.e., san Affiliation greater than san
Autonomy), high n Affiliation was associated with a
preference for taking walks with friends.

For subjects

explicitly committed to solitude (i.e., san Autonomy
greater than san Affiliation) , n Affiliation was related
to involvement in letter writing during random pagings--a
sort of compromise behavior that allows implicit motive
satisfaction within the bounds of the self-image's
constraints.
The results of the above studies are rendered more
strongly supportive of a specific, directional
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relationship between self-attributed and implicit motives
by the repeated finding that implicit motives do not
enhance self-attributed motives' prediction of respondent
behavior.

For example, in a multiple regression analysis

of constantian's just-discussed data, McClelland (1985a)
concluded, "The only significant contributor to predicting
affiliative choices is (san) Affiliation: neither
(implicit) motive nor perceived skill level nor their
interaction is related to reports of liking to do things
with friends" (p. 823).

In Biernat's (1989) study, san

Achievement was significantly related to the number of
achievement-related statements selected as the "eight most
appealing attributes" of a hypothetical person, chosen
from a list of 21 statements.

However, n Achievement was

significantly related to the dependent measure for
neither overall, high-san Achievement, nor low-san
Achievement groups.

In general, then, it seems that

implicit motives do not exert a channeling effect on selfattributed motives analagous to the empirically-supported
mediating role that self-attributed motives adopt vis-avis implicit presses (Biernat, 1989; McClelland, 1975a).

CHAPTER III
CONSTRUCTS GERMANE TO THE CLARIFICATION OF RELATIONSHIPS
BETWEEN IMPLICIT AND SELF-ATTRIBUTED MOTIVES
As already noted, both measure-based and constructbased explanations have been advanced to explain the
failure of TAT and self-report motive measures to
intercorrelate.

One way to marshal support for the

construct-based explanation, which is the primary goal of
this study, would be to show that the two types of measure
do in fact correlate, but only for certain people.
Specifically, TAT and self-report measures should
intercorrelate only for those individuals for whom
implicit and self-attributed systems are in relative
harmony.

The a priori division of people into motive-

consistent and motive-inconsistent subgroups, then, should
result in one group for whom the TAT and self-report
motive measures are unrelated (or even correlate
negatively) and another group for whom the two types of
measure corroborate--if the construct-based explanation is
correct.

If measure-based explanations for TAT-

questionnaire incongruities are correct, however, no
differential relationship should be obtained for motive58
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congruent and motive-incongruent groups.
The present chapter concerns itself with innerdirectedness and other-directedness, two variables
presumed to differentiate motive-congruent individuals
from others.

Additionally, personal strivings and

personality abilities will be introduced, both of which
may mediate relationships between self-attributed and
implicit systems.

All four of these constructs will

permit further examination of the relationships between
implicit and self-attributed motives.
Inner-Directedness
Inner-directedness refers to a general proclivity
toward focusing one's attention inwardly and
intrapsychically, rather than outwardly and socially.
Wymer and Penner (1985) define the construct as a tendency
to "be aware of and attentive to internal dispositions"
(p. 1004).

Actually, inner-directedness, which is a

factor-analytically derived dimension, is composed of two
defining facets--private self consciousness (Fenigstein,
Scheier, & Buss, 1975) and personal identity (Cheek &
Briggs, 1982).

The former facet concerns a tendency

to direct one's attention toward one's motives, feelings,
thoughts, and behavioral dispositions (Scheier, Buss, &
Buss, 1978), while the latter involves an imbuing of the
self-knowledge gained from this internal focus
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with self-definitional import.

Taken in tandem, private

self consciousness and personal identity make for an
individual who (1) knows his or her inner, organismic self
and (2) expresses that self via self-image, word, and
choice.

From a contemporary motivational perspective,

inner-directedness should mediate congruence between
implicit and self-attributed layers:

a focus on implicit

experience, with a concomitant commitment to the
incorporation of such experience into the self-image
should, over time, lead to a schematic identity that fits
the implicit "facts."

Inner-directedness, in other words,

should foster the self-attributed system's accommodation
to experiential realities.

McClelland et al.

(1989), in

fact, implicate self-conscious processes in the
equilibrating of implicit and self-attributed systems,
speculating that "systematic experience-based self
observation ... may bring the two types of motives into
alignment" (p. 700).
The speculation that inner-directedness should foster
motive congruence is supported by Wymer and Penner's
(1985) finding that inner-directedness mediates the
prediction of operant behavior from self-report.

In an

initial session, subjects took a battery of measures
assessing various mediator variables, including innerdirectedness.

Their attitudes toward religion (i.e., a

san-like construct) were also assessed via Thurstone and
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chave's (1929} Attitudes Toward the Church Scale and
zanna, Olson, and Fazio's (1980) measure of religious
attitudes.

One month later, subjects filled-out a

comprehensive, retrospective inventory of their recent
involvement or non-involvement in various religious
behaviors.

Hence, at least to the degree that responses

were accurate, the measure tapped religious trends in
(largely) operant behavior.

As predicted, subjects high

in inner-directedness showed a greater correspondence
between value and behavior scores than did their less
inner-directed peers.

In other words, inner-directed

individuals' views of themselves mirror, in relative
terms, the flavor of their implicitly-motivated behavior.
The framing of inner-directedness as a determinant of
motive congruence is further supported by a wealth of data
concerning its private self-consciousness facet.

Private

self-consciousness, like inner directedness, is related to
enhanced congruence between self-reports and behavior.
Scheier et al.

(1978), for example, assessed subjects'

degree of private self-consciousness and san
Aggressiveness.

Weeks later, subjects' actual

aggressiveness was measured via an "aggression machine"
paradigm (Buss, 1961, 1963), in which subjects served as
teachers to pupils (actually experimental confederates) in
a concept formation task.

"Aggressiveness" was

operationalized as the average intensity of bogus shocks
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administered by teachers as punishment for errors made on
learning trials.

As predicted, the overall correlation

between san Aggressiveness and behavior differed markedly
for subjects high and low in private self-consciousness.
While the former evidenced a highly significant selfreport/behavior correlation, the latter's behavior did not
correspond at all to their self-attributed aggressiveness.
While the dependent variable in this study did involve
choice behavior (i.e., choosing between various shock
magnitudes), participants

were in no way made aware of

the implications of shock administration for their san
Aggressiveness (i.e., there was no social aggression
incentive).

In fact, the task was, if anything,

explicitly allied with achievement (i.e., being an
effective teacher).

Hence, this study seemed to involve

behavior residing in a middle position on the operantrespondent continuum.

Turner (1978c, Experiment One),

employing a more definitively operant behavioral
criterion, has replicated Scheier et al 1 s. general
findings.

In this study, power was the focal attribute,

operationalized as degree of conversational domination in
a problem-solving group.

As predicted, private self-

consciousness mediated the correspondence between a
previously-obtained measure of san Power and the operant
power criterion.

High private self-conscious subjects,

then, evidence a more robust self-report/behavior

63

correlation than low self-conscious subjects.
A number of studies have additionally linked private
self-consciousness to (1) an enhanced awareness of one's
affective state and (2) a subsequent expression of this
state in behavior.

Scheier (1976), for example, employed

the aforementioned aggression machine paradigm with a
twist:

prior to the teaching phase, confederate-pupils

watched teacher-subjects perform a difficult puzzle task.
While the confederates observed quietly for control
subjects, they actively badgered and insulted the
experimental subjects, thus inducing anger.

For low

private self-conscious subjects, neither average shock
intensity nor self-reports of post-experimental anger
differed between experimental and control conditions.
Experimental high self-conscious subjects, however,
reported significantly more anger and also administered a
higher mean shock level than did high self-conscious
controls.

Hence, high-self conscious subjects seem to be

both more aware of their angry reactions and more willing
to let these reactions guide their behavior.
Subsequent studies have found private selfconsciousness to mediate other types of affective
experiences as well.

Scheier and Carver (1977), for

example, had male undergraduates rate either arousing
slides of nude women or disgusting slides of human
atrocities "according to how much of a bodily reaction
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(they) seemed to be having" (p. 628).

In another

experiment, the researchers had subjects rate their mood
following induction of either elation or depression via
velten's (1968) previously validated procedure.

In all

analyses, private self-consciousness was positively
related to more elevated affect-based ratings, whether the
induced affect was attraction, repulsion, elation, or
depression.

This "self-consciousness effect" has also

been found in regard to the experience of sympathy
(Scheier, Carver, & Shulz, 1978, Experiment Two):

high

private self-conscious individuals show more compassion
for a handicapped target person than do others, as
reflected in more favorable overall evaluations.
A final relevant study suggests that private selfconsciousness is related to a relative focus on internal
cues and away from social cues and pressures.

More

specifically, Scheier, Carver, and Gibbons (1979) found
high private self-conscious subjects to attend more to
internal sensory cues and less to socially-provided
expectancies in judging the taste of various solutions.
Moreover, these taste-judgements were made on a respondent
scale; private self-consciousness, then, was related to
the self-attributed system's relative reorientation from
social presses to internal promptings.
While validity data abounds on private selfconsciousness, as assessed by Fenigstein et als.

1

(1975)

65

self-Consciousness Scale, validity data pertaining to
inner directedness' second facet, personal identity, is
restricted to the Personal Identity Scale's (Cheek &
Briggs, 1982) face validity.

This instrument requires

subjects to rate six items on a five-point Likert scale (0

= "Not at all important to my sense of who I am;" 5 =
Extremely important to my sense of who I am.").

Specific

items address intrapersonal phenomena such as "emotions
and feelings," "dreams and imagination," and "thoughts and
ideas."

While private self-consciousness concerns both an

awareness of the organismic self and a tendency toward
behavioral expression of this self, personal identity
seems more concerned with a reorienting of the selfattributed system, or self-image, to fit internal reality.
The person high in both dimensions, then, should show an
enhanced consistency between operant and respondent
behaviors.
Other-Directedness
A second construct that should, assuming the
correctness of McClelland et al's.

{1989) theory, mediate

TAT/self-report congruence is other-directedness.

This

factor-analytically derived construct subsumes two facets.
These are other-focus, or a "willingness to change one's
behavior to please others" (Wymer & Penner, 1985, p. 1003)
and situational variability, or a tendency toward
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"situational instability in trait-related behaviors"
(Wymer & Penner, 1985, p. 1003).

The former is assessed

via several items from Snyder's (1974) factorially complex
self-Monitoring Scale (SMS), which requires subjects to
rate self-statements as "true" or "false."

Analysis of

these items suggests a high-scorer who is keenly attuned
to social incentives and invested in pleasing others
(e~g.,

"In order to get along and be liked, I tend to be

what people expect me to be rather than anything else."
<True>; "When I am uncertain how to act in a social
situation, I look to the behavior of others for cues"
<True>).

The situational variability facet is measured by

Bern and Allens'

(1974) three-item Situational Variability

Scale (SVS), which requires test-takers to rate their
cross-situational variability on traits of sociability,
conscientiousness, and helpfulness.

This scale, then,

implicates variation in "situations," rather than changes
in internal press, as the culprit for behavioral
variability.

Furthermore, these behavior-influencing

situations are predominantly social; helping, socializing,
and some aspects of conscientiousness (e.g., punctuality)
cannot occur in a vacuum.

It is hence assumed that high

scorers on the SVS will be strongly oriented, at the selfattributed level, toward social demands while being
relatively ignorant of their implicit dispositions.
A precious few studies suggest that other-
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directedness and its facets are detrimental to the selfattributed system's alignment with implicit realities.
First, Wymer and Penner's (1985) aforementioned study of
religious values and behaviors examined the mediating
effects of other-directedness.

As expected, subjects low

in other-directedness showed a significantly greater
correlation between san Religiosity and subsequent
religious behavior than did other subjects.

Although the

SMS has undergone extensive validational research, none of
these efforts have considered the other-focus factor
independently.

As the SMS is composed of multiple factors

(i.e., other-focus, acting, and extraversion) that often
have opposing behavior-mediating effects, it would be
misleading to cite global SMS research in examining the
other-focus factor's effects (Briggs, Cheek, & Buss, 1980;
Gabreyna & Arkin, 1980; Wymer & Penner, 1985).

Other-

directedness' situational variability facet, however, has
been researched in a single, well-devised study.

In a

pretest session, Bern and Allen (1974) measured subjects'
§fill

Friendliness and san Conscientiousness via self-

report, as well as their variability on each dimension.
San Friendliness predicted the spontaneous initiation of
conversation--an operant behavioral criterion, only for
subjects low in situational variability.

Situational

variability effects were also obtained in the case of
conscientiousness:

situational stability significantly
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enhanced san Conscientiousness' prediction of two out of
three operant criteria (i.e., promptness in returning a.
series of questionnaires by mail and number of assigned
course readings completed at mid-semester).
Personal Strivings
Personal strivings reflect, along with life tasks
(Cantor & Kihlstrom, 1987), personal projects (Little,
1983), and current concerns (Klinger, 1977, 1987),
personality psychology's recent reinvestment in
motivational constructs (Emmons, 1989).

Strivings have

previously been defined as "idiographic instantiations of
major (implicit) motives, such as achievement,
affiliation, intimacy, and power" (Emmons & McAdams,
1989).

Further clues as to strivings' theoretical nature

come from the way in which they are assessed.

Personal

strivings are operationalized as responses to a striving

list, which requires subjects to generate between 10 and
20 written rejoinders to the stem, "I typically try to ... "
(Emmons, 1989, p. 96).

Notably, the striving list task

straddles the operant-respondent assessment continuum.
Striving lists resemble operant measures in that (1)
specific responses are not provided, and (2) the social
incentives attached to various subject-generated responses
remain undefined.

On the other hand, striving lists are

similar to respondent questionnaires in their invocation
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of verbal, self-reflexive thought: strivings represent
subjects' conceptualizations about their actions rather
than their spontaneous, artless behavior itself.

The full

striving assessment procedure, as employed by Emmons
(1989), also has subjects make a number of judgments and
ratings of their strivings following list generation;

the

various resultant variables (e.g., valence, ambivalence,
past attainment, probability of success, etc.) are,
however, beyond the scope of the present discussion.
Emmons has also developed a coding system that allows for
the assignment of individual strivings to various thematic
groupings, such as achievement, intimacy, and power.

Via

this assignment, idiographic strivings (e.g., "I typically
try to understand others;" "I typically try to dominate in
conversation."), much like idiosyncratic TAT stories, can
be recategorized into nomothetic constructs (e.g.,
intimacy strivings, or 2 Intimacy, and power strivings, or
2 Power) and be quantified.
Much as they straddle operant and respondent
measurement categories, personal strivings, when examined
against the backdrop of McClelland et al. 's (1989) bilevel motivational theory, seem to occupy an interesting
middle ground between implicit press and self-image.

As

already noted, Emmons (1989) sees individual strivings as
more circumscribed instantiations of pervasive implicit
dispositions.

In addition to being more focused than
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implicit motives, strivings are conscious, verbal, and
explicit.

Hence, they can be imagined as emissaries

between vast, silent implicit regions and more verbal
governing bodies.

Strivings personalize transpersonal

implicit presses, such that autochthonous motives (e.g.
"Dominate at every opportunity.") now feel familiar, egosyntonic, socially acceptable, and consistent with
explicit, abstract goals (e.g., "Win the football game.").
Personal strivings represent compromises or limited
agreements between often discordant layers of personality.
If the above premises are correct, then personal
strivings should relate to both implicit and selfattributed systems, even if the two systems are largely
unrelated--or even in disharmony.

Actually, Emmons and

McAdams (1989) have garnered some initial, tentative
support for this contention in an analysis of the
intercorrelations between implicit motives (n Achievement,

n Intimacy, and n Power) and their self-attributed and
striving counterparts.

In the case of achievement, our

hypothesis was supported:

significant correlations

between both (1) n Achievement and
E.fil1 Achievement and

§

§

Achievement, and (2)

Achievement seem more robust than

the obtained correlation between

n

Achievement and san

Achievement, although the relative strengths of
correlation coefficients were not analyzed statistically.
In the case of power, a more definitive picture emerged.
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specifically, n Power -

§

Power and san Power -

§

Power

pairings yielded significant positive correlations, while
the n Power - san Power pairing suggested an almost
complete absence of relationship.

In the case of

intimacy, the results were less conclusive.
rt is clear that n Intimacy and
significantly related.

§

Intimacy are

Due to a low N in analyses

involving san Nurturance (an intimacy-like construct),
however, neither a significant, moderate

n

Intimacy with

san Nurturance correlation nor a nonsignificant san
Nurturance with
illuminating.

§

Intimacy correlation are particularly

In summary, then, Emmons and McAdams'

(1989) analysis provides partial support for strivings'
mediational role in relationships between implicit and
self-attributed systems.

Furthermore, a replication of

their findings is clearly needed.
Personality Abilities
Like personal strivings, personality abilities are
motive-like constructs that occupy a conceptual middle
ground on the implicit/self-attributed continuum.

Paulhus

and Martin (1987) define a personality ability as "the
degree of skill with which an individual can execute a
particular social routine under optimal conditions" (p.
355).

While their term will be preserved, the present

study conceives personality abilities to be more akin to
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motivational traits than to skills:

personality

abilities, as assessed in the relevant research, seem less
concerned with the success of, say, dominant behaviors and
more concerned with the frequency and magnitude of

attempts at domination.

The personality ability concept

follows from Wallace's (1967) suggestion that observed
personality traits, or tendencies toward displaying
certain types of behavior, represent an interaction
between predispositions toward trait expression and trait
inhibition.

In the present terminology, then, it may be

that self-attributed motives are composed of two
components--a "pure" motive component, or personality
ability, and an inhibition component.

From this vantage,

the personal ability would be closely allied with implicit
dispositions, as a sort of verbal-conceptual accompaniment
or reflection of organismic realities.

The inhibitory

component, on the other hand, would be allied with the
self-image and related concerns of identity-management and
social propriety.

In interaction, the inhibitory

component, but not the personality ability component,
would serve to squelch both (1) the awareness and accurate
self-report of implicit motive dispositions (as with
repression, denial, etc.), and (2) the enactment of such
dispositions under self-conscious situations.

If these

theoretical speculations are correct, then, personality
abilities should relate more strongly to implicit motives

73

than do self-attributed motives.
In trying to separate raw personality ability from.
obscuring inhibition, Willerman, Turner, and Peterson
(1976) have advocated the use of maximal measures.

Rather

than asking about the test-taker's typical behavior,
maximal measures address the most extreme level of traitrelated behavior that the test-taker is capable of.
standard respondent, self-report measures can be
transformed into maximal measures by simply rewording the
basic test question:

instead of subjects being asked,

"How friendly are you?," for example, they are now asked,
"How friendly are you capable of being?"

It is presumed

that maximal measures largely circumvent response
inhibition by side-stepping the issue of self-image.
Maximal measures allow one to self-attribute a high degree
of a personal ability without owning it (e.g., "I can be
very competitive, but I am not necessarily a competitive
person.").

In more cognitive terms, maximal measures

require a scanning of long-term memory for a most extreme
exemplar of a behavioral trait expression.

Motive

questionnaires, on the other hand, require the invocation
of abstract self-schemas.
The premise that maximal questionnaires tap a motivelike index that is relatively unconfounded with inhibitory
anxiety has as yet to be addressed empirically.

Maximal

instructions for laboratory behavior, however, do seem to
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foster the disinhibition of behavioral dispositions.
Klein and Willerman (1979), for example, found that the
replacement of typical instructions (i.e., "Behave as you
typically would") with maximal instructions (i.e., ''Be as
dominant as you can") eliminated female subject's
reluctances to behave dominantly toward a male: while
women behaved more dominantly with female than with male
confederates under typical instructions, they were equally
dominant with both genders under maximal instructions.

In

a similar study, Turner (1983) found peers to rate
socially anxious subjects as being significantly less
dominant than other subjects under typical instructions.
Under maximal instructions, however, peer ratings did not
differ for anxious and nonanxious groups.

To the extent

that maximal measures have the same effect as maximal

instructions for laboratory behavior, then, it appears
that maximal methodologies are relatively successful in
separating the effects of personality abilities from those
of inhibition.
There is an additional reason to believe that
maximally-assessed personality abilities will relate more
strongly to implicit motives than do self-attributed
motives.

As is readily evident from a perusal of

McClelland et al.s'

(1989) paper, the implicit motive

system represents, among other things, a contemporary
reframing of psychodynamic conceptions of "id" and
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"unconscious.''

This theoretical heritage is evident, for

example, in descriptions of the implicit system's
automatic (i.e., unconscious) functioning and orientation
toward intrinsic pleasures (i.e., pleasure principle).

It

is also probable that, as with the psychodynamic
unconscious, notions of opposition are irrelevant at the
implicit level.

In other words, the coexistence of

"dialectical'' implicit motives, like n Affiliation and

n Autonomy, may not imply conflict or contradiction.
Indeed, Atkinson (1981), in his account of implicit
functioning, frames the stream of overt, spontaneous
behavioral activity as reflecting the covert, unconflicted
fluctuations and interactions of motive arousal levels.
The consummation of one implicit aim, which is followed by
a sort of motivational refractory period, allows for the
nonconflictual expression of different and opposing
implicit aims.
At the self-attributed level, however, opposition is
a relevant concept.

In fact, factor analyses of self-

attributed motives suggest opposition to be a key
ingredient in the conceptual glue that binds the selfimage.

Paulhus and Martin (1987), for example, comment

that "one of the.best established results in personality
assessment is the circumplex structure of interpersonal
traits" (p. 355;); the 16 most popular motivational
traits, when factor analyzed, fall into a circular array
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of opposing constructs, such as hostility/nurturance and
dominance/submission (Smith, 1984; Wiggins, 1979; Wiggins

& Broughton, 1985) .

Furthermore, variation between

dialectically opposed aims is for many, including many
clinically-minded psychologists, related to ideas of
incoherence, contradiction, splitting, and identity
diffusion.

The important point for the present discussion

is that self-attributed personality abilities do not share
self-attributed motives' grounding in an organizational
rubric of opposition.

Hence, they may reflect the

implicit system more accurately.

In fact, factor-analyzed

personality abilities yield a positive manifold structure
rather than a circumplex (Broughton & Paulhus, 1984):
personality abilities which stand in conceptual opposition
to one another show no negative correlations with one
another.

It seems, then, that personality abilities are

again more closely aligned with implicit motives than are
self-attributed motives.
Summary
The present study aims to garner support for
theoretical, as opposed to methodological, explanations
for operant and respondent motive measures' lack of
relationship.

One way to do this is to show that certain

conceptually-relevant variables mediate obtained operantrespondent relationships.

First, mediational roles would
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be implicated if "self-consciousness variables," such as
inner-directedness or other-directedness, were found to
affect operant-respondent correspondence for certain
people.

Inner-directedness, a dispositional tendency

toward focusing attention on one's inner world, should be
related to increased intermotive correspondence; otherdirectedness, which involves an attentional focus on
social demands and behavioral guidelines, should be
related to decreased intermotive correspondence.
Mediational roles would also be suggested if
"go-between constructs," such as personal strivings and
personality abilities, were shown to relate to implicit
and self-attributed constructs that are unrelated to each
other.

In particular, personality abilities, or

inhibition-free, verbal representations of organismic
realities, should relate more strongly to implicit motives
than do self-attributed motives.

Personal strivings, or

focused, verbal-conceptual instantiations of broad
implicit dimensions, should relate to both implicit and
self-attributed motives.
The above propositions represent the conceptual
groundwork that underlies the present work's
investigative hypotheses.

Each posits a relationship

between various constructs based upon structural
considerations.

However, the interrelation of motives and

motive-like constructs depends as much upon content as
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upon structure.

Structural considerations aside, we would

not expect, for example,

n Intimacy to relate

substantially to san Achievement, while we might expect n
power to relate to san Dominance.

Before hypotheses can

be formally stated, then, issues of motivational content
must be addressed.

It is with such matters that the next

chapter is concerned.

CHAPTER IV
AGENCY AND COMMUNION
The present work is primarily concerned with the
structural aspects of motivation--with the organization of
motives into a bi-level system.

This focal examination of

social motives' structural attributes, however, occurs
against an organizing backdrop of thematic contents.

As a

prelude to the introduction of featured motives and
their measures, which occurs later in the present chapter,
and to the formal statement of hypotheses, which occurs in
the next chapter, this background will now be brought to
center stage.
Theoretical Background
Virtually all of the specific motives and motive-like
constructs employed in the present study reflect one of
two broad thematic categories.

These categories have been

identified by Bakan (1966) as agency and communion.

He

writes:
Agency manifests itself in the formation of
separations, isolation, alienation, aloneness, the
urge to master, and the repression of thought,
feeling, and impulse; communion is manifested in a
sense of being at one with other organisms, a lack of
separations, the lack and removal of repression,
contact, openness, and union, and noncontractual
cooperation
(Bakan, 1966, p. 15)
79
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Agency and communion are two fundamental adaptational
modalities that apply to all living things.

Agency

encompasses basic instincts toward the protection,
assertion, and expansion of the self.

Communion, on the

other hand, is reflected in collective phenomena-phenomena of inclusion, participation and interdependence.
As noted by McAdams (1988a), agency and communion are
particularly pertinent to the classification of human
social motives.

Agentic motives involve the individual's

mastery of other, and to a lesser degree of self, from
from a vantage of separateness.

Communal motives, on the

other hand, pull for empathic merger with social and
perhaps intrapsychic contexts.
The concepts of agency and communion are not new.
Instead, they represent timeless, archetypal clusterings
of ideas that continually resurface in the theorizing of
dualistically-inclined philosophers and psychological
theorists (McAdams, 1988a).

For example, Empedocles, a

presocratic philosopher, identified strife, or separation,
and love, or union, as the root principles inherent in all
movement and change (McAdams, 1988b; Russell, 1945).
only did love and strife account for the phenomena of
physics; they also accounted for the dynamics of human
relationships and even history.

Many centuries later,

Freud reduced the gamut of human motivation to the

Not
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workings of two primal ends--eros and thanatos.

Eros,

like communion, aims to "combine more and more living
substance into even greater quantities," (Freud, 1933, p.
140).

On the other hand, thanatos, or agency, encompasses

both aggression and the repetition of traumas for the sake
of mastery and control, with an ultimate aim of
reachieving an inorganic state.

Agency and communion are

similarly reflected in Rank's (1936) life fear/death fear
duality.

For Rank, there is an innate terror inherent in

emerging from symbiosis to face one's individuality;
like communion, this life fear promotes social embededness
and attachment.

Furthermore, it is offset by an opposing

fear of losing whatever individuality one has won, or
death fear.

Like agency, Rank's death fear fosters both

self-protective strivings and a related distancing from
the interpersonal and intrapsychic contexts.

As noted by

McAdams (1988a), agency and communion are also inherent
in a number of more recently proposed theoretical
dualisms.

These include, for example, masculine and

feminine sex-role orientations (Bem, 1974), interpersonal
distancing positions of individuation-deindividuation and

attachment-detachment (Kaplan, 1988), and developmental
psychologies of independence and inclusion (Kegan, 1982),
or individuation and interdependence (Gilligan, 1982).
Both agency and communion, as they apply to social
motives, are captured by a few central, defining facets.
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Agency's three components are separation, mastery, and
domination.

The separation component involves the

individual's disengagement from interpersonal contexts,
contexts which for others would comprise a rich life
field.

Agentic separation is exhibited, for example, in

strivings toward autonomy and in the person's active
dissociation from the opinions and values of others or of
society at large.

Agentic separation is further evident

in a willful foregoing of strong interpersonal attachments
or investments.

In summary, motives toward separation

foster the objectification of inner and outer reality:
agentic separation informs the vital developmental process
of "casting-out" or "throwing away from" that replaces
contextual embeddedness with the possibility of
relationships between a self and distinct social and
phenomenological objects (Kegan, 1982).
While agency's separation facet fosters a distancing
from context, the mastery and domination facets concern
the individual's attitude toward context.

More

specifically, mastery involves an attitude toward the
objectified self while domination represents an attitude
toward objectified others.

Regarding the former, agentic

mastery is embodied by the heroic ego (Hillman, 1979),
which separates itself from the chaos of id and
establishes a reality-based dominion over it.

In fact, a

major criticism of Freud is that he ignored the ego's own
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mastery-based motives, framing it as a victim of
contradictory forces rather than a goal-seeking force in
its own right (Patterson, 1986).

The ego, as a conceptual

embodiment of agentic mastery, finds both (1) limiting the
self, as with repression, suppression, sphincter control,
activity regimens, abstinence, and inhibition, and (2)
pushing the self to its physical, intellectual, spiritual,
and ethical limits to be inherently satisfying.

Agentic

mastery, then, involves both pushing personal limits, as
in excelling, and limiting personal "push," as in selfcontrol.

Mastery is expressed phenomenologically in

experiences of ambition, determination and effort.
Agentic domination, which represents an otherdirected mirror image of self-mastery, involves the
submission of the interpersonal world to personal ends.
Agentic domination renders other people as both vehicles
for the individual's continuing self-aggrandizement and
subjects to it.

The former is evidenced in activities as

diverse as persuading, competing, helping, exciting,
exploiting, teaching, degrading, and inspiring; the latter
is evident in concerns with prestige and impression
management, as well as investment in high-visibility
activities such as acting, public speaking, and politics.
All of these examples involve a tacit, temporary
transformation of relationships between equals into
relationships between superiors and inferiors (e.g.,
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winner-loser, helper-helpee, film star-fan); agentic
individuals gain particular pleasure from being in the
superior, "one-up" social position and also from having an
impact on others.

While dominative motives typically

receive a negative cast in contemporary American society,
it is noteworthy that they can serve both benevolentprosocial, as in teaching and leading, as well as
malevolent-antisocial ends.
Like agency, communion is reflected in three central
facets: unity, intimacy, and nurturance.

The first of

these facets is manifest in "the participation of the
individual in some larger organism of which the individual
is a part" (Bakan, 1966, p. 15).

Unity is an orientation

toward contact and connection with one's social group,
reflecting an ethic of interdependence rather than
independence.

The unity-oriented person tends toward

sociability, cooperativeness, and gregariousness, as
benevolent relations with the social group become the very
fabric of personal identity.

Rather than the ego, then,

it is the social group that provides organization,
direction, and self-esteem.

Unity also pulls for an

unquestioning adoption of group concerns, beliefs, values,
and conventions.

In a sense, unity represents a

voluntary, pleasurable relinquishing of individuality:
self-other distinctions become blurred, as "I-ness" is
subsumed by "We-ness."
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Communion's second facet, intimacy, is concerned with
select others rather than the social group as a whole.
Intimacy, in short, represents a drive toward sharing
oneself and experiencing someone else in the deepest
possible sense.

Deriving from the Latin term for "inner"

or "inmost" (Perlman & Fehr, 1987), intimacy most
centrally reflects a sharing with another of that which is
inmost (McAdams, 1988a).

McAdams (1988a) writes:

In communion, the vulnerable self risks even greater
vulnerability by surrendering control in
interpersonal relations and offering the self up as a
kind of gift, awaiting the reciprocal gift-giving of
the other. Bakan's communion mandates intimate selfdisclosure in the presence of a listener who receives
the disclosure as a gift, cherishing it as a token of
an ever-developing closeness.
(p. 20)
Intimacy hence represents an attraction to a special type
of dyadic interpersonal relationship characterized by
openness, receptivity, and reciprocity--by a noncontractual giving of oneself and receiving of other.
Also encompassed by the intimacy facet are 1) a real
concern for the other's well-being and 2) a surrender of
any form of control over the parameters of the
relationship (McAdams, 1988b).

In summary, intimacy is

epitomized by "being in an encounter which is perceived as
an end in itself rather than (by) doing or striving to
attain either a relationship or some extrinsic reward
(McAdams, 1988b, p. 76).

Although it is underemphasized

in the literature, the intimacy facet also has a self-
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reflexive aspect, as manifest in openness to experience
(McCrae & Costa, 1985), regression in the service of the
ego (Holt, 1970), abaissement di niveau mental (Jung,
1968), and absorption (Tellegen & Atkinson, 1974).

In

fact, measures of socially-defined communion correlate
positively with a self-report measure of openness to
experience (Hoffman, 1989).
Communion's final facet, nurturance, is exclusively
concerned with the giving and receiving of help, where
help is broadly defined to include emotional, material,
physical, developmental, and social forms of aid.

In

Murray's (1938) terms, nurturance, as defined presently,
encompasses needs for both nurturance and succorance.

The

former is expressed in sympathetic attempts at gratifying
the needs of a helpless other: "an infant or any O (other)
that is weak, disabled, tired, inexperienced, infirm,
defeated, humiliated, lonely, defected, sick, mentally
confused" (Murray, 1938, p. 184).

Hence, nurturance

involves the response to an empathic perception of
another's need, rather than indiscriminate helping.
Murray's succorance, on the other hand, involves wishes to
"have one's needs gratified by the sympathetic aid of an
allied O;" "to always have a supporter" (p. 182).

From a

truly communal perspective, the distinction between giving
and receiving help is actually irrelevant, as communion is
predicated on a sort of blurring of boundaries between
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self and other, mine and yours.
It should be clear at this point that agency and
communion stand in conceptual opposition to one another.
However, as recognized by Bakan (1966), Jung (1971), Bern
(1981), Kaplan (1988), and others, the two dimensions
represent independent human potentials rather than poles
of a single thematic dimension.

Actually, levels of

agency and communion interact so as to either mitigate and
transform each other's effects or facilitate one or the
other's pure expression.

Agency mitigated by communion,

for example, loses its malevolent, destructive qualities
(Bakan, 1966).

On the other hand, unmitigated communion

is related to a dependent personality style, and
unmitigated agency is r'eflected in an aggressive
personality style (Hoffman, 1989).

A lack of both agency

and communion, finally, is related to the schizoid
personality style, with its acquisitive and interpersonal
apathies.

Agency and communion, then, are separate

dimensions whose interactions account for different
personological patterns.

Actually, some recent factor

analytic research suggests that agency's empirical
opposite is concerned with anxiety and a lack of
confidence rather than with communion.

Communion's

opposite, furthermore, seems to be an apathetic,
unresponsive cold-heartedness (Trapnell & Wiggins, 1990).
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agentic Constructs and Measures
TAT Power Motivation.

Winter (1973) has developed a

TAT measure of n Power, which is a "recurrent preference
or readiness for experiences of having impact and feeling
strong ... vis-a-vis the environment" (McAdams, 1988b, p.
84).

As a facet of implicit agency, power motivation

captures the aforementioned domination facet.

Winter and

Stewart (1978), for example, write, ''the essence of power
is the ability to make the material world and the social
world conform to one's own image or plan for it" (p. 400).
Indeed, a drive toward domination is reflected in each of

n Power's four defining themes:

conquest, exploitative

relationships, organization, and prestige.

Conquest

represents the urge to dominate in its most primitive,
unveneered form--in the urge to overpower through patently
aggressive acts.

Males high in n Power, for example,

participate in directly competitive sports significantly
more often than others and also engage in more frequent
aggressive acts, such as insulting store clerks and
yelling in traffic (Boyatzis, 1973; Winter, 1973).
Similarly, n Power is positively correlated with frequency
of reported arguments in working-class males (McClelland,
1975).

Power motivation's second defining theme,

exploitative relationships, involves the use of
friendships and romantic relationships as vehicles for
further domination.

In the realm of friendship, men and
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women high in n Power tend to adopt an active, assertive,
controlling role and to prefer large groups to more
intimate dyads (McAdams, Healy, & Krause, 1986}.

In men,

n Power also correlates positively with number of sexual
partners (Winter, 1973} and with disclosure of details of
sex life (McClelland, 1975).

More generally, high-n Power

men, like the literary character, Don Juan, have an eatthem-up-and-spit-them-out orientation toward love
relationships, as evidenced in a tendency to move from one
serious relationship to another in rapid succession.
Organization and prestige, n Power's third and fourth
defining themes, represent more sublimated expressions of
agentic domination.

In the case of the former, social

domination is sought through the occupation of sociallysanctioned power positions.

For example, n Power

correlates positively with occupation of leadership
positions in various organizations by both college
students (Winter, 1973} and working-class adults
(McClelland, Wanner, & Vanneman, 1972}, and with
preferences for careers that involve the direction of
others' behaviors (Winter & Stewart, 1978).

Fodor and

Smith (1982}, furthermore, found high Il Power individuals
to foster an authoritarian, discussion-inhibiting
atmosphere when appointed leader of a problem-solving
group.

Power motivation also leads to attempts at social

domination via alliance with consensually-defined signs of

90

power.

Along these lines, n Power is related to both the

furnishing of personal dorm rooms with prestige
possessions, such as televisions, framed posters, and tape
players, and number of credit cards carried on one's
person (Boyatzis, 1973; Winter, 1973).
TAT Achievement Motivation.

N Achievement,

which is

the most extensively researched of the TAT social motives,
is defined as "a concern with doing things better, with
surpassing standards of excellence" (McClelland et al.,
1953, p. 228).

This implicit disposition, then, involves

a rendering of the self as a vehicle for agentic assertion
and expansion, such that power or potency is experienced
through personal accomplishment rather than through social
domination; n Achievement is differentiated from n Power,
then, in that the former concerns personal performance
while the latter concerns social impact (Veroff, 1982).
From another perspective, n Achievement can be seen as a
more socialized derivative of n Power, where the
individual seeks to dominate symbolically, by surpassing
internalized societal standards in a benevolent, prosocial
manner, rather than literally, by overwhelming others in
an adversarial manner.

The excitement of power-related

activity is replaced by the satisfaction of a job well
done.

Taken in tandem, these considerations suggest n.._

Achievement to be a relatively pure marker for agency's
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mastery facet.
A substantial body of research supports

n

Achievement's contentual grounding in agentic mastery.

In

particular, n Achievement has been repeatedly linked to a
gravitation toward, striving at, and success in academic
and business endeavors.

In particular, achievement-

oriented college students adopt a performance-oriented
stance toward their schoolwork, such that grades take-on
special significance.

Andrews (1966), for example, found

positive correlations between n Achievement and both (1)
investigating course requirements prior to registration,
and (2) discussing exams with instructors before and after
exam administration.

N Achievement assessed during the

college years also predicts involvement in the business
world 14 years later (McClelland, 1965).

In fact, n

Achievement has repeatedly been found to predict
involvement and success with entrepreneurial activity,
which places a premium on personal performance, control,
and responsibility (Koestner & McClelland, 1990).

As an

example, Indian farmers (i.e., agricultural entrepreneurs)
high in n Achievement are more likely than others to both
experiment with innovative farming approaches (Sinha &
Mehta, 1972) and to show enhanced productivity over time
(Singh, 1979).
Several studies have also examined n Achievement's
relation to "doing better" in social and even physical
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domains.

High-achievement children receive higher ratings

than others on social cooperativeness and general
likeability (Feld, 1967; Lifshitz, 1974; Teevan,
Diffenderfer, & Greenfeld, 1986).

In adults, n

Achievement is related to marital adjustment (McAdams &
vaillant, 1982; Veroff & Feld 1970) and peers' perceptions
of the individual as successful in life, as well as work
(Kaltenback & McClelland, 1958).

Finally, n Achievement

is related to higher self-ratings of personal health
(Veroff, 1982); it also predicts cardiac health, 30 years
subsequent to motive assessment (McClelland, 1979).
Various mediators and mitigators have been identified
in the relationship between n Achievement and performance.
Furthermore, each of these factors supports n
Achievement's linking with a specific behavioral, as
opposed to task, incentive, thus supporting
Il Achievement's structural grounding in the implicit
motivational system.

As already alluded, the presumed

behavioral incentive for n Achievement is an innately
pleasurable sense of "doing better."

This presumption is

supported by numerous studies linking n Achievement to a
preference fDr activities of moderate challenge (Atkinson,
1958; Clark & McClelland, 1956; Karabenick and Youseff,
1968; McClelland et al., 1989; Raynor & Entin, 1982).
Apparently, moderately challenging activities maximize the
probability of experiencing the emotional-behavioral
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incentive, as neither too-easy nor too-difficult tasks
afford a sense of having accomplished something or
improved performance (Koestner & McClelland, 1990).

Other

studies have identified self-determination and
performance feedback as further preconditions for the
expression of n Achievement in behavior.

Extrinsic

incentives and controls, such as money (Atkinson, 1958;
oouvan, 1956) or promptings to hurry (Schroth, 1988),
eliminate n Achievement's performance-enhancing effects.
This makes sense theoretically, in that social pressures
(1) tacitly reframe the task in an incentive-irrelevant
manner, and (2) de-emphasize personal responsibility for
outcome (Koestner & McClelland, 1990).

Performance

feedback on the other hand, has been shown to enhance n
Achievement's behavior-predicting power (Bartmann, 1965;
French, 1958).

Again this finding is consistent with

theory, as knowing whether or not one has "done better" is
essential to the postulated behavioral incentive for
achievement behavior.
Autobiographical Agency.

n

Achievement and

n

Unlike TAT measures of

Power, which only capture a given

facet of agency, McAdams'

(1990) story-based

autobiographical agency measure taps all relevant facets
of agency, or n Agency.

In fact, the measure was

explicitly designed with Bakan's (1966) formulations in
mind.

Like TAT measures, the autobiographical agency
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measure relies on the thematic coding of subject-produced
stories.

In this case, however, the stories represent

accounts of nuclear episodes from the test-taker's life
narrative, rather than stories told to vague pictures of
interpersonal events.

Although McAdams' formal system

calls for the scoring of ten nuclear episodes, the present
study examines only two of these--the earliest memory and
the peak experience.

These two were chosen because of

their conceptual fit with the previously-advanced notions
of implicit motives.
McAdams'

Peak experiences are defined in

(1990) Guided Autobiography packet as a moments

or episodes in the individual's life "in which he or she
feels a sense of transcendence, uplifting, inner joy or
peace, excitement, or some other highly positive emotional
experience."

As such, the peak experience seems an

especially apt medium for implicit motive assessment, as
implicit motives are purportedly built upon, and organized
around, pleasurable affective experiences (McClelland et
al., 1989).

Early memories, on the other hand, are

thought to represent symbolic expressions of foundational
object relations paradigms.

Mayman (1968), for example,

comments that
early memories are expressions of important fantasies
around which a person's character-structure is
organized ..•. the themes which bind together the
dramatis personae of a person's early memories define
nuclear relationship-patterns (i.e., patterns of
social motivation) which are likely to repeat
themselves in a wide range of other life
situations
(p. 304)
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similarly, Saul et al.

(1956) note that early memories

"reveal, probably more clearly than any other single
psychological datum, the central core of each person's
psychodynamics (and) chief motivations" (p. 235).

In

conclusion, there is good reason to expect both peak
experiences and early memories to be appropriate vessels
for implicit motivational themes.
At present, McAdams' autobiographical coding system
remains an experimental measure; relevant empirical
validity data on autobiographical agency scores'
suitability as operationalizations of n Agency does not
yet exist.

The coding system does, however, boast a high

degree of face validity.

Specifically, peak experiences

and early memories are scored for the presence or absence
of four agentic themes:

strength/impact,

status/recognition, competence/accomplishment, and
autonomy/independence.

The strength/impact category

reflects particular aspects of both agentic domination
(i.e., trying to have an impact on others) and agentic
mastery (i.e., trying to expand the self's strength in
physical, mental, moral and/or emotional domains).
Status/recognition and competence/accomplishment,
furthermore, capture those aspects of agentic domination
and mastery not covered by strength/impact.

status/

recognition involves attempts to "attain a high level of
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social standing vis-a-vis others" (McAdams, 1990. p. 5),
while competence/accomplishment addresses attempts at
pushing one's personal limits, or

excelling.

Lastly,

McAdams' autonomy/independence category is a clear,
straightforward operationalization of agency's separation
facet.
Bern Sex Role Inventory Masculinity Scale.

In a

comprehensive review of numerous popular self-report
scales, Wiggins and Broughton (1985) identified the Bern
sex Role Inventory's (BSRI's) Masculinity scale as the
best measure of "ambitious-dominant traits" (p. 39), or in
our terms, san Agency.

Furthermore, analysis of the

scale's 20 self-descriptive adjectives suggests a
comprehensive and relatively even covering of agency's
three defining facets.

Seven of the items deal with

agentic separation (sample items: "independent;" "selfsufficient,") while another seven reflect agentic
domination (sample items:

"act as a Leader;" "forceful").

The remaining five scale items address assorted aspects of
agency's mastery facet (sample items: "ambitious,"
"athletic") .
Studies relevant to the BSRI Masculinity scale's
validity are restricted to examinations of maeculine sextyped subjects, or subjects who score both high on BSRI
Masculinity and low on the BSRI's Femininity scale.

Bern's

(1981) definition of masculine sex-typing bears striking
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resemblance to McClelland et al.'s {1989) more general
formulations of self-attributed motives.

Specifically,

the masculine sex-typed individual is someone
motivated to keep her or his behavior consistent with
an idealized image of ... masculinity, a goal that she
or he presumably accomplishes both by selecting
behaviors and attributes that enhance the image and
by avoiding behaviors and attributes that violate the
image.
(Bern, 1981, p. 4).
The present paper's exclusive consideration of masculine
sex-typed subjects, rather than of all subjects scoring
high on BSRI masculinity, follows from Bern's (1981)
warning that androgenous individuals (i.e., people who
score high on both BSRI masculinity and femininity) are
not necessarily high on san Agency; instead, they are
usually people for whom sex-role distinctions are not
salient.

Androgenous people, in other words, do not

construe themselves and their implicit impulses based on
sex-role constructs.

Instead, they exhibit a behavioral

and situational flexibility (some have called this
inconsistency) that belies a lack of investment in being
consistently masculine or feminine.
Research on BSRI Masculinity, or more accurately,
masculine sex-typing, supports both the construct's
structural basis in the self-attributed system and its
contentual basis in agency.

Several studies have examined

masculine sex-typing's effect on the processing of verbal,
self-conceptual information.

Masculine sex-typing is
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related both to enhanced recall of agentic selfdescriptive adjectives and to enhanced access to episodic
memories supportive of agentic self-ascribed traits
(Markus, Crane, Berntein, & Siladi, 1982; Mills, 1983).
Masculine .sex-typing also affects processing speed for
identity-consistent, or agentic, and identityinconsistent, or communal, descriptors:

masculine sex-

typed. people take significantly less time to endorse
agentic self-descriptive adjectives than to endorse
communal self-descriptive adjectives; they also take less
time to identify inapplicable communal adjectives as such
than to identify inapplicable agentic adjectives (Markus
et al., 1982).

Following exposure to a masculine identity

threat, masculine sex-typed individuals rate themselves as
significantly more masculine than do masculine sex-typed
controls or androgenous subjects (Babl, 1979).

Taken

together, the above findings suggest BSRI-assessed
masculine sex-typing to tap an investment in both (1)
maintaining and presenting an agentic self-image, and (2)
avoiding or denying potential communal attributes
inconsistent with this self-image.
Numerous studies have also linked masculine sextyping to agentic behavior (Bern, 1981).

Bern (1975), for

example, found masculine sex-typed individuals to display
an agentic separation from the opinions of peers.
Specifically, masculine sex-typed subjects' ratings of
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cartoons' funniness were relatively unaffected by (bogus)
information as to others' ratings.

As another example,_

Bem and Lenney (1976) had subjects choose 30 behaviors
from a list of 60 agentic, communal, and neutral options,
informing them that they would subsequently be
photographed engaging in these 30 activities.

Masculine

sex-typed subjects evidenced significantly more avoidance
of communal behavioral options than did others.

Masculine

sex-typed individuals also display significantly more
aggression than do others, where "aggression" is
operationalized as the average magnitude of shocks
administered to a bogus opponent in a competitive shock
paradigm (Hoppe, 1979).

Kaplan and Sedney (1980) have

criticized studies like those above for their
artificiality, noting that BSRI validational studies are
typically conducted in "high self-conscious" situations.
From the present perspective, however, BSRI masculine sextyping's apparent predictive restriction to agentic
behaviors in self-conscious situations enhances the
instrument's validity as a measure of san Agency.
A maximal rephrasing of the BSRI masculinity scale
will be used to assess agentic personal abilities, or

£ Agency.

Specifically, each agentic adjective from the

BSRI scale will be embedded in the stem, "How
you capable of being?"

are

As with the standard BSRI,

subjects will rate each of these stems on a seven-point
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Likert scale (1 = Not at all capable; 7 = Extremely
capable).

This is a purely experimental measure for wnich

no prior validational research exists.

It does, however,

share the BSRI Masculinity scale's face validity as a
measure of agency.
Agentic Adjective Checklist (ACL) scales.

A second

measure of san Agency to be employed in the present study
is actually a composite measure of
and Dominance scales.
reasons.

the ACL's Achievement

These scales were chosen for two

First, the two scales, taken in tandem, cover

the ambitious-dominant factor's, or agency's, full breadth
(Wiggins & Broughton (1985).

Second, they share a common

heritage with TAT and autobiographical motive measures-both are based in Murray's (1938) need formulations.

The

ACL Achievement scale is expressly concerned with agency's
mastery facet, assessing a self-attributed need "to strive
to be outstanding in pursuits of socially recognized
significance" (Gough & Heilbrun, 1983, p. 8).

Gough and

Heilbrun (1983) expand on this definition thusly:
The high-scorer on Ach is a hard-working, goaldirected individual, who is determined to do well and
usually does. The motivation to succeed seems to lie
less in competitive drives than in an insistent need
to live up to high and socially commendable criteria
of performance.
(p. 8)
The ACL's Dominance scale, on the other hand, captures a
self-attributed need "to seek and maintain a role as
leader in groups, or to be influential and controlling in

101
individual relationships" (Gough & Heilbrun, 1983, p. 8),
or agentic domination.

Adjectival descriptors with a high

positive loading on ACL Dominance include aggressive,
dominant, assertive, forceful, and stubborn.

Actually,

one third of ACL Dominance's items concern agentic
separation, rather than dominance.

In fact, these items

are also included on the ACL's Autonomy scale.

ACL

Dominance, then, concerns a self-reported need to "act
independently of others or of social values and
expectations" (Gough & Heilbrun, 1983, p. 12) as well as a
need to dominate.

This truism is reflected in Gough and

Heilbrun's description of the high-scorer on ACL Dominance
as someone who is "little ... inhibited by the disapproval
or opposition of others" (p. 9).
Validity data for the ACL scales comes from two
sources: peer ratings and correlations with similar
constructs from other psychological instruments.

As

regards the former, ACL Dominance is positively correlated
with observers ratings of masculinity (i.e., robust, selfsufficient, and strong) and dominance (Gough & Heilbrun,
1983).

For women, ACL Achievement is also positively

related to dominance ratings.

In a correlational analysis

of the ACL and Gough's (1987) California Psychological
Inventory (CPI), Gough and Heilbrun (1983)

found both ACL

Achievement and ACL Dominance to correlate positively and
significantly with the CPI's Intellectual Efficiency
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(i.e., persistent, self-motivated, and economical) and
Dominance scales.

Additionally, ACL Achievement related

to CPI Achievement via Conformance, while ACL Dominance
was related to CPI Capacity for Status (i.e., ambitious,
independent) and Social Presence (i.e., self-assured,
forthright).

In addition to supporting ACL Dominance's

and ACL Achievement's, validities, the above nomological
net also suggests a good deal of Dominance-Achievement
overlap.

Hence, the general validity of the superordinate

agency construct is supported as well.
Agentic strivings.

Emmons'

(1988) manual for the

thematic coding of personal strivings includes three
striving categories concerned with agency--g SelfSufficiency/Independence, g Power, and g Achievement.

In

fact, each of these dimensions represents a relatively
pure measure of one of agency's three facets.

~

Self-

Sufficieny/Independence is concerned with agentic
separation.

Scoring criteria include "Concern with being

an individual, separated, autonomous from others," and
"Concern with seeking, establishing, or maintaining
independence" (Emmons, 1988, p. 25).

Examples of

category-relevant strivings include "Be myself and not do
things to please others," "Be different," and "Keep my
thoughts independent of others" (Emmons, 1990, pp. 25-26).
~

Power, on the other hand, captures agentic domination,

encompassing strivings for social impact, social control,
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status, notoriety, winning in competition with others, and
indiscriminant helping.

Typical instantiations of

§

Power

are "Be the dominant sibling in a family of six,"
"Impress people," "Act as therapist to friends,"
"Entertain others," and "Show that I'm superior to others"
(Emmons, 1988, p. 16).

While

others via competition,

§

§

Power involves dominating

Achievement is more concerned

with agentic mastery, or competing with self-imposed
standards.

Scoring criteria for

§

Achievement involve

meeting goals, excelling, or expending effort; sample
strivings include "Set high goals for myself and try to
reach them," and "Put my best effort into everything I do"
(Emmons, 1988, p. 5).
Although some validational research has been
conducted on various striving variables (for a review, see
Emmons, 1989), Emmons and McAdams'

(1989) aforementioned

study is the only one to examine individual agentic
strivings.

While the results have already been presented

as supportive of strivings' structural attributes, these
same results also corroborate the just-discussed content
validity data, at least for

§

Power and

§

Achievement.

Specifically, both striving categories were found to
correlate positively and significantly with more wellvalidated markers of their agentic facet domains:

§

Achievement correlated with TAT-assessed n Achievement and
PRF-assessed san Achievement, while

§

Power was related to
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TAT-assessed n Power and PRF Dominance.
communal Constructs and Measures
TAT Intimacy Motivation.

McAdams (1979) has

developed a TAT motive measure of

n

Intimacy that is

explicitly derived from Bakan's (1966) reflections on
communion.

N

Intimacy is defined as "a recurrent

preference or readiness for experiences of warm, close,
and communicative exchange" (McAdams, 1988b, p. 77).

As

such, it represents an orientation to dyadic interpersonal
relationships characterized by reciprocal self disclosure:
one's innermost self is surrendered or offered to another,
and reciprocally, the other is warmly received through
careful listening.
Validational research both expands on n Intimacy's
nature and further illustrates its grounding in
communion's intimacy facet.

Employing a beeper

methodology, McAdams and Constantian (1983) found college
students high in n Intimacy to spend significantly more
time involved in conversation and letter-writing than
others.

Furthermore,

n

Intimacy correlated positively and

substantially with percentage of random beepings during
which students where concerned with interpersonallyoriented thoughts; it also correlated negatively with
percentage of interacting episodes in which students
wished to be alone or not interacting.

McAdams and Powers
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(1981) have also linked n Intimacy to a thematic
clustering in thought and action.

High-intimacy

individuals engage in significantly more discrete
behaviors indicative of merger, such as physical proximity
behavior and "we" references.

They also emphasize

communal themes--themes of reciprocal dialogue, surrender
of control, and positive affect, when asked to structure
their own psychodramas.

Finally, high-intimacy

individuals tend toward a communal presentation of self,
as reflected in positive correlations with peer ratings on
communal adjectives (i.e., sincere, loving, and likable).
In two distinct studies, then,

n

Intimacy has been linked

to a communal ordering in both spontaneous thought and
operant behavior.
A number of additional studies attest to

n Intimacy's validity and breadth as a facet measure of
communion.

Coding videotaped, open-ended interviews,

McAdams, Jackson, and Kirshnit (1984) found high-intimacy
individuals to engage in eye contact, smiling, and
laughing--all nonverbal behaviors aimed at maintaining or
bolstering contact and warmth.

These same persons'

interview accounts of friendship episodes also evidenced a
comparative emphasis on self disclosure and adopting the
listener role with friends.

Additionally,

n

intimacy has

been shown to relate to information processing:
intimacy individuals are selectively attentive to

high-
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communion-related facial cues (McAdams, 1979) and
selectively recall episodic memories tinged with
interpersonal themes (McAdams, 1982b).
and Vaillant (1982) found

n

commun~l

Finally, McAdams

Intimacy to predict adult

males' marital satisfaction 17 years after motive
assessment.
Autobiographical Communion.

McAdams'

(1990)

autobiographical coding system, as previously discussed in
the context of agency (seep. 93), also includes a highly
face valid, four-category thematic coding system for
communion.

In this case, the categories are

unity/togetherness, love/friendship, dialogue/sharing, and
care/support.

As in the case of McAdams' four agentic

categories, these four communal dimensions address the
full range of implicit communal social motives, or

n Communion, in a comprehensive way.

The unity/

togetherness category encompasses allusions to the
blurring of boundaries between self and social context,
and as such, marks communion's unity facet.

The

love/friendship and dialogue/sharing categories
respectively involve the experience of "positive affect as
the result of an interpersonal relationship" (McAdams,
1990, p. 11) and an actor's engagement in reciprocal,
noninstrumental social interaction.

In tandem, then, the

two categories cover communion's intimacy facet.
Care/support, the autobiographical communion system's
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final thematic category, reflects communion's nurturance
facet, involving either the giving or receiving of help,_
support, or comfort.
Bern Sex Role Inventory Femininity Scale.

After

factor analytically reviewing several of personality
psychology's most popular self-report trait scales,
Wiggins and Broughton (1985) judged the BSRI Femininity
scale to be the "best'' (i.e., contentually most accurate)
measure of "warm-agreeable interpersonal traits" (p. 39),
or communion.

The scale's thematic fit with communion can

be further fine-tuned via observance of Pedhazur and
Tetenenbaum's (1979) factor analytically informed
recommendations.

Specifically, they advocate the

elimination of six communion-inconsistent items from the
Femininity scale and the addition of five communionconsistent items from the BSRI's 20 neutral, "filler"
items.

The resultant 19-item, revised BSRI Femininity

Scale is both thematically and empirically more homogenous
(Costos, 1986).

In fact, content analysis of the scale

suggests a broad covering of communion's various facets.
The intimacy facet is represented by adjectives that
either address the behavioral-affective concomitants of
closeness (e.g., "warm;" "affectionate") or imply a
concern with relational honesty and empathy (e.g.,
"sincere;" "understanding").

Other items address the

friendly, prosocial orientation that accompanies communal
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union (e.g., "cheerful," "friendly") and the caring,
supportive stance of communal nurturance (e.g., "eager to
soothe hurt feelings;" sympathetic").
The distinction between sex-roles and androgyny
advanced in the context of BSRI Masculinity applies to
BSRI Femininity as well.

Hence, the evidence supporting

BSRI Femininity's validity as a measure of san Communion
will be restricted to data on feminine sex-typed
individuals.

Some of this data links feminine sex-typing

with self-schematic processes.

Feminine sex-typed people

exhibit enhanced recall for both recently-presented
communal self-descriptors and episodic memories that
support their espoused communal identities (Markus et al.,
1982).

Additionally, feminine sex-typing increases the

speed with which individuals can identify identityconsistent descriptors as such and also deny identityinconsistent descriptors.

Feminine sex-typed individuals

endorse identity-consistent communal descriptors faster
than noncommunal identity-consistent adjectives; they also
deny identity-inconsistent agentic descriptors more
quickly than other identity-inconsistent descriptors
(Markus et al., 1982;

Mills, 1983).

Feminine sex-typing,

then, seems related to a schematic "pocket of certainty"
concerning an espoused communal persona and denied agentic
attributes.
Feminine sex-typing also has a number of correlates
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in the domain of communal choice behavior.

When given a

choice between various activities, for example, feminine
sex-typed individuals spend more time engaged in a
nurturant activity (i.e., interacting with a kitten) and
also enjoy the nurturant activity more than masculine sextyped people (Bern, 1975).

Feminine sex-typing is also

related to an avoidance of agentic activity options when
individuals are presented with a variety of activities to
choose from (Bern & Lenney, 1976).

As a final example,

feminine sex-typed individuals choose communal
(traditional) career interests over agentic (nontraditional) ones on a career preference questionnaire
(Clarey & Sanford, 1982).
As in the case of the BSRI Masculinity scale, a
rephrased version of the revised BSRI Femininity scale
will be employed to assess communal personal abilities, or
~

Communion.

Each of the scale's communal adjectives will

be inserted into the stem, "How

are you capable of

being?,'' and subjects will rate each sentence's selfrelevance on a seven-point Likert scale.
experimental measure is unresearched.

This

By virtue of its

derivation from the BSRI Femininity scale, however, it
does have appreciable content validity as a measure of
communion.
Communal Adjective Checklist (ACL) scales.

A second

measure of san Communion employed in the present study
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involves the combination of the Murray need-derived ACL
Nurturance and ACL Intraception scales into a composite
measure.

The choice of these two scales stems largely

from Wiggins and Broughton's (1985) identification of both
as zero-order correlates of the warm-agreeable, or
communal, interpersonal trait dimension.

ACL Nurturance

is defined as a need "to engage in behaviors that provide
material or emotional benefits to others" (Gough &
Heilbrun, 1983).

While the scale is expressly concerned

only with communion's nurturance facet, however, it, upon
closer examination, appears to involve union and intimacy
facets.as well.

Regarding the former, the high scorer on

ACL Nurturance "appears to like people; to have a
cooperative, unaffected, and tactful social manner" (Gough

& Heilbrun, 1983, p. 10).

Furthermore, the intimacy facet

is suggested by descriptions of the high-nurturance
individual as someone who both "moves toward people,
rather than away from them (and) attempts to understand
others" (Gough & Heilbrun, 1980, p. 10), and

"has

warmth .. .'(and) the capacity for close relationships"
(Gough & Heilbrun, 1983, p. 10).
Where ACL Nurturance is at least predominantly
concerned with the provision of material and emotional
benefits to others, ACL Intraception is more concerned
with communion's intimacy facet.

Specifically, ACL

Intraception concerns a self-attributed need "to
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understand one's own behavior or the behavior of others"
(Gough & Heilbrun, 1983, p. 10); hence, Intraception
concerns intimacy in both its interpersonal and
intrapsychic manifestations.

Analysis of actual scale

content corroborates this conclusion:

50 percent of the

items are concerned with a humane, communal interpersonal
orientation (sample items: considerate, forgiving,
sensitive, tolerant), while another 20 percent address an
openness to experience (sample items: imaginative,
reflective, insightful).

The remaining scale items, which

involve logicality and foresightedness, are unrelated to
communion.
Only limited validity data is available for the
ACL's Intraception and Nurturance scales.

At least in the

case of women, ACL Nurturance correlates significantly and
positively with observer's ratings on femininity;
"femininity'' in this case was operationalized as a
behavioral manner that is "receptive, responsive, and
sympathetic" (Gough & Heilbrun, 1983).

Nurturance is also

positively related to a few communal CPI constructs, such
as Good Impression (i.e., an orientation toward pleasing
others rather than asserting the self), Communality (i.e.,
focused on "fitting in" with the group and being
"average"), Socialization (i.e., ready to conform
comfortably to societal guidelines; men only) and
Tolerance (i.e., tolerant of alternate beliefs and values;
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women only).

Like ACL Nurturance, ACL Intraception is

also positively correlated with CPI Good Impression,
communality (women only), Socialization (men only), and
Tolerance.

It is additionally related to CPI Sociability

(i.e., friendliness) and Hogan's (1969) Empathy Scale
(Gough & Heilbrun, 1983).
Communal Strivings.
Emmons'

Two striving categories from

(1988) coding system, § Intimacy and§

Interpersonal, connote aspects of communion.
now be discussed sequentially.

These will

Five of the six scoring

categories for § Intimacy are concerned with strivings
toward empathic, euthymic, reciprocal, communicative
relationships with select others. As such, they capture
communion's intimacy facet.

The sixth scoring category

for§ Intimacy, which concerns loyalty and responsibility
toward the social group, seems more reflective of
communion's unity facet.

Sample intimate strivings

include "Stay close to Pam," "Be respectful to everyone,"
and "Try to be a good listener," (Emmons, 1988, pp 13-14).
Furthermore, § Intimacy correlates positively and
significantly with

n

Intimacy, a well-validated measure of

communion's intimacy facet (Emmons & McAdams, 1989).

To

the degree that Emmons' long list of sample intimate
strivings is a representative one, it appears that §
Intimacy's single, unity-based scoring category accounts
for a disproportionate amount of the actual intimate
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strivings that people produce.

Furthermore, items

concerning nurturant helping also appear with some
frequency.

~

Intimacy, then, may be best construed as a

composite intimacy-unity-nurturance measure.
The g Interpersonal category includes all strivings
that concern others rather than the self.

Unlike other

striving categories, then, 2 Interpersonal addresses the
object, or direction, of the striving rather than the
striving's specific

content.

Contentually agentic

strivings, such as "dominate in arguments with others,"
can still be scored in this (purportedly) communal
category.

The inclusion of this dimension in the present

study is based on the theoretical assumption that the
proportion of other-referent to self-referent strivings
provides a rough index of communion's unity facet:

to the

extent that strivings reflect integrations of the self, as
James (1890) and Rank (1936) would agree, then a high
score on g Interpersonal suggests a self with a social,
rather than personal locus.

As already noted, this social

locus of the self is the very crux of communion's union
facet.

Tentative support for 2 Interpersonal's communal

nature comes from its modest, positive correlation with

n

Intimacy (Emmons & McAdams, 1989).
Summary
All of the motive and motive-like constructs employed
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in the present study are thematically grounded in either
agency or communion, both of which represent exceedingly
broad contentual clusterings.

Both agency and communion

can be reduced to three defining facets or themes:
separation, mastery, and domination, and unity, intimacy,
and nurturance.

The specific constructs and related

measures employed in the present study cover all three
agentic and communal facets at the implicit, striving, and
self-attributed levels (see Table 1).

Implicit agency, or

n Agency, is connoted by McAdams' (1990) autobiographical
agency measure, TAT n Power, and TAT n Achievement, while
communion, or n Communion, is assessed by both McAdams'
autobiographical communion measure and TAT n Intimacy.

At

the respondent level, agency, or san Agency, and
communion, or san Communion, are each measured with the
BSRI and ACL.

Both the BSRI Masculinity scale and the

combined ACL Achievement and Dominance scales cover
agency's three facets.

Similarly, communion is

comprehensively covered by both BSRI Femininity and the
ACL Nurturance/ACL Intraception composite.

Finally, one

striving construct is included for each of agency's
facets.

These striving-facet pairings are as follows: §

Self-Sufficiency/agentic separation,
domination, and

§

§

Achievement/agentic mastery.

is represented at the striving level by
Interpersonal.

Power/agentic

§

Communion

Intimacy and 2

115
Table 1.--Classification of Agentic and Communal Motive
Measures

------------------------------------------------------------Agentic Facets
Motive
variables
Implicit

Sep
Bio AG

Motives
strivings

.e

Ind

SelfBSRI-M
Attributed ACL AG
Motives

Mas

Communal Facets

Dom

Int

Uni
Bio CM

Bio AG

Bio AG

Bio CM

n Ach

n Pow

n Int

.e

.e

Ach

BSRI-M
ACL AG

Pow

BSRI-M
ACL AG

(,eint)
BSRI-F
ACL CM

Nur
Bio CM

,einter
,eint
(,eint)
BSRI-F
ACL CM

BSRI-F
ACL CM

Note. Parentheses indicate a secondary covering of the facet
area.
Sep = Separation facet; Mas = Mastery facet; Dom =
Domination facet; Int = Intimacy facet; Uni = Unity facet;
Nur = Nurturance facet; Bio AG = Autobiographical Agency; Bio
Cm = Autobiographical Communion; n Ach = TAT-assessed n
Achievement; n Pow = TAT-assessed n Power; n Int = TATassessed n Intimacy; .e Ind = .e Self-Sufficiency/ Independence;
.e Ach = .e Achievement; .e Pow = .e Power; .e Inter = .e
Interpersonal; .e Int= .e Intimacy; BSRI-M = BSRI Masculinity;
BSRI-F = BSRI Femininity; ACL AG = ACL Agency; ACL CM = ACL
Communion.

CHAPTER V
SUMMARY AND HYPOTHESES
The present study seeks support for construct-based,
as opposed to psychometric, explanations for operant and
respondent motive measures' lack of relationship.

There

are in fact numerous reasons why implicit and selfattributed motives should be normatively misaligned.
Specifically, the two types of motive differ from each
other in terms of operational mode, domain of behavioral
influence, behavioral incentives, and developmental
origins.

Implicit motives are affect-based schemata that

automatically influence spontaneous behavior and respond
to behavioral incentives; self-attributed motives are
conscious, verbal schemata that influence choice behavior
in the face of social incentives.

Furthermore, implicit

motives stem from early, preverbal affective experiences,
while self-attributed motives develop somewhat later, via
internalization of verbalized parental/societal values.
While implicit and self-attributed motives comprise
.distinct motivational systems that need not be in accord,
certain factors should nonetheless mediate intermotive
relationships---if the whole implicit/self-attributed
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framework is valid.

First, inner-directedness, a tendency

to focus attention on one's inner world, should relate to
increased intermotive correspondence.

Second, other-

directedness, a tendency to focus attention on social
demands and guidelines, should result in decreased
intermotive correspondence.

Third, high inner-

directedness and low other-directedness should interact to
produce a particularly high degree of intermotive
correspondence.

Finally, personality abilities and

personal strivings should relate to implicit and selfattributed motives in specific ways: personality abilities
should relate more substantially to operant motives than
do self-attributed motives, while personal strivings
should relate to both implicit and self-attributed motives
(For a summary of the reasoning informing the above
propositions, see Chapter III).
The above ideas are restated below as formal
investigative hypotheses.

For each proposition, two

hypotheses are advanced--one for agentic motives and one
for communal motives.

Agentic motives are thematically

organized around separation, mastery, and domination,
while communal motives share a thematic basis in unity,
intimacy, and nurturance.
la.

Increased inner-directedness will be related to
increased correspondence between operant-agentic
and respondent-agentic measures.
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lb.

Increased inner-directedness will be related to
increased correspondence between operantcommunal and respondent-communal measures.

2a.

Decreased other-directedness will be related to
increased correspondence between operant-agentic
and respondent-agentic measures.

2b.

Decreased other-directedness will be related to
increased correspondence between operantcommunal and respondent-communal measures.

3a.

Subjects high in inner-directedness and low in
other-directedness will show a higher degree of
agentic operant-respondent correspondence than
other subjects; subjects low in innerdirectedness and high in other directedness will
show a lower degree of agentic operantrespondent correspondence than other subjects.

3b.

Subjects high in inner-directedness and low in
other-directedness will show a higher degree of
communal operant-respondent correspondence than
other subjects; subjects low in innerdirectedness and high in other directedness will
show a lower degree of communal operantrespondent correspondence than other subjects.

4a.

Agentic personality abilities, tapped via
maximal measures, will relate more strongly to
operant-agentic measures than do respondent-
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agentic measures.
4b.

Communal personality abilities, tapped via
maximal measures, will relate more strongly to
operant-communal measures than do respondentcommunal measures.

5a.

Agentic personal strivings should relate to both
operant-agentic and respondent-agentic measures,
even if these measures do not relate to each
other.

Sb.

Communal personal strivings should relate to
both operant-communal and respondent-communal
measures, even if these measures do not relate
to each other.

CHAPTER VI
METHOD
Subjects
A sample of 133 undergraduate students was studied.
All subjects were students in introductory psychology
courses at a medium-sized urban midwestern university.
Subjects received class credit in exchange for their
participation.

Two subjects from this overall sample were

eliminated following their giving obvious misinformation
on the demographics sheet (i.e., reporting their ages as
106 and 95).

Of the remaining 131 subjects, 67 (51%) were

female and 64 (49%) were male.
Procedure and Measures
Subjects were run in groups of 15-20 in a single
session lasting 1-3/4 hours.

In all sessions, the same,

single experimenter was present.

At the beginning of the

session, subjects were informed, "Today you will be taking
a number of psychological measures."

After 1) reading and

signing a statement of informed consent and 2) entering
their age and gender on a demographics sheet, subjects
were administered the TAT following standard procedures
for group administration (McAdams, 1979; Winter, 1973).
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This consists of 6 pictures projected on a screen for 15
seconds each.

After each picture, subjects have 5 minutes

to write an imaginative story based on the picture.
Upon completion of the TAT, all subjects were given
an initial test battery, along with the instructions:
This packet contains a number of paper-and-pencil
measures. When you are done with this packet, please
raise your hand.
I will then bring you a second
packet which you will have the remainder of the
session to complete.
Finally, I would like to
underscore that you may notice some similarities
between various measures that you take today.
Despite this, please try to answer each item on its
own terms only, and do not worry about your previous
responses to similar items on other measures.
The comment in these instructions regarding item
similarity was meant to discourage mechanical reproduction
of BSRI responses on the maximal modification of the BSRI
(B-MAX).

At the end of the testing session, subjects were

appropriately debriefed.
The first test battery consisted of the following
measures, listed in order of their appearance in the
packet:
(1) Peak Experience and Early Memory.

Peak

experience and early memory tasks were extracted from
McAdams'

(1990) more comprehensive Guided Autobiography

packet.

For both, subjects are first provided with 1) a

general definition of one or the other type of life
episode and 2) guidelines for written accounts of episode
exemplars.

A written example of a personal peak
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experience or early memory is then solicited.

In the case

of peak experiences, subjects recount a personal high
point, noting what happened in the episode, when it
happened, relevant thoughts and feelings, and who was
involved.

Subjects also comment on the implications of

the episode for their identity.

The early memory task

requests a written account of the subject's earliest clear
episodic recollection.

Subjects also estimate their age

at the time of the episode and speculate on the
personological ramifications of the memory.
(2) Striving list.

Emmons'

(1988) striving list

consists of 20 reproductions of the sentence stern, "I
typically try to."

Instructions identify strivings as

"things that you typically or characteristically are
trying to do in your everyday behavior," and subjects are
encouraged to consider the life domains of work/school,
home/family, social relationships, and leisure/recreation
in identifying their strivings.

No striving limit is

provided, although subjects are asked to provide a minimum
of 10.
(3) Situational Variability Scale (SVS).

The SVS is

a three-item self-report questionnaire that asks subjects
to rate their level on a given trait dimension (sample
item:

"In general, how friendly and outgoing are you?")

and then their variability on that same dimension (sample
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item:

"How much do you vary from one situation to another

in how friendly and outgoing you are?").

Both trait level

and variability are rated on a seven-point Likert scale
(l="Not at all;" ?="Extremely").

The three variability

responses were summed to yield an overall behavioral
variability index, while the three trait ratings were not
employed.

It is noteworthy that trait ratings on this

scale are independent of variability ratings (Bern & Allen,
1974).

The SVS variability index has a coefficient alpha

of .51 and has previously been found to mediate selfreport/behavior congruence (Bern & Allen, 1974; Wymer &
Penner, 1985).
(4) Personal Identity Scale.

This six-item self-

report measure was extracted from Cheek and Briggs'
larger Aspects of Identity Scale.

(1982)

Each item (sample item:

"My emotions and feelings;" "My dreams and imagination")
concerns a phenomenological domain; subjects are asked to
rate each of these domains' self-definitional importance
on a five-point Likert scale (O="Not at all important;"
4="Extremely important").

Wymer and Penner (1985),

obtained a coefficient alpha of .77 for the scale and also
reported an unpublished "45-day test-retest reliability of
.69 11 (p. 1006).

This face valid measure comprises part of

inner-directedness, which has been found to mediate selfreport/behavior congruence (Wymer & Penner, 1985).
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(5) Self-Consciousness Scale (SCS).

Fenigstein et

al.'s (1975) SCS is a 17-item self-report instrument that
measures both public and private self-consciousness.
Although the entire measure was administered, only the 10item Private Self-Consciousness subscale is germane to the
present study.

Each item (sample items: "I'm always

trying to figure myself out;" "I'm constantly examining my
motives") is rated as to its self-relevance on a fivepoint Likert scale (O="Extremely uncharacteristic;"
4="Extremely characteristic").

Wymer and Penner (1985)

computed a coefficient alpha of .59 for this scale, and
Fenigstein et al.
of .79.

(1975) report a test-retest reliability

Substantial validity data is available on

private-self consciousness' relationship to both
self-report/behavior congruence and affective awareness.
(6) Bern Sex Role Inventory CBSRI).

This 60-item

self-report measure requires the test-taker to rate a
series of potentially self-descriptive adjectives and
phrases on a 7-point Likert scale (l="Never or almost
never true;" 7="Always or almost always true").

For the

sake of efficiency, only the BSRI items relevant to BSRI
Masculinity or Femininity, as outlined earlier, were
included on the form given to subjects.

In line with the

recommendations of Pedhazur and Tetenbaum (1979), item
content for the Femininity Scale was altered to better fit
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both abstract conceptualizations of communion and factor
analytic findings.

The researchers' further

recommendation that the item, "Masculine," be dropped from
the BSRI Masculinity Scale was also followed; the
inclusion of a gender-based descriptor for a dimension
that transcends gender seems inappropriate.

Respective

coefficient alphas for the standard BSRI Masculinity and
Femininity scales are .78 and .87, while their test-retest
reliabilities have been estimated at .85 and .86, over a
4-week period (Bern, 1981).

As discussed previously, the

BSRI Masculinity and Femininity scales have undergone
extensive validation.
(7) Self-Monitoring Scale (SMS).

Although only the

SMS' Other Focus facet is of interest in the present
study, the entire, 25-item instrument was administered.
Each item is a self statement (sample items: " At parties
and social gatherings, I do not attempt to do or say
things that others will like" <false>; "In different
situations with different people, I often act like very
different persons" <true>).

The test-taker endorses each

of these statements as either true or false.

Eleven of

these items comprise the SMS Other Focus measure, which
has a coefficient alpha of .70 (Wymer & Penner, 1985).
Although test-retest reliability data is not available on
just the Other Focus subscale, the whole SMS has a
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reliability coefficient of .84, with a 1-month lag
(Snyder, 1974).

This highly face valid measure has been

found in a previous study to mediate self-report/behavior
congruence (Wymer & Penner, 1985).
The measures comprising the second test battery,
listed in order of appearance, were as follows:
(1) Adjective Checklist CACL).

A shortened, 152-item

version of the 300-item ACL was devised such that only
items relevant to the Achievement, Dominance,
Intraception, and Nurturance scales were included.
Subjects endorse adjectives as self-descriptive by placing
an "X" next to them; the spaces next to inapplicable
adjectives are simply left blank.

Coefficient alphas for

the Achievement, Dominance, Intraception, and Nurturance
scales are .84, .79, .78, and .83, respectively.

The

scales' respective test-retest reliabilities, computed
over a 6-month delay, are .73,
Heilbrun, 1983).

.76, .61, and .73 (Gough &

As previously noted, the four scales

have been validated against peer ratings and correlations
with similar constructs from other psychological
instruments.

For the purposes of this study, ACL

Achievement and Dominance scales were summed to yield an
overall ACL Agency measure, and ACL Intraception and
Nurturance were combined to yield ACL Communion.
(2) Maximal modification of the BSRI CB-MAX).

Items
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from the BSRI Masculinity and Femininity scales, as
outlined above, were inserted in the stem, "How

are

you capable of being?" to yield a maximal measure of
agency and communion, or £ Agency and £ Communion.
Although the items' order of appearance was switched from
that of the BSRI, the BSRI's 7-point Likert scale format
was preserved.

The B-MAX is a purely experimental measure

for which no consistency or reliability data exists.

B-

MAX measures of £ Agency and £ Communion do, however,
share their BSRI counterparts' substantial face validity
as measures of agency and communion.
Scoring Procedures
After all data were collected, various thematic
coding systems were implemented.

The TAT protocols were

scored according to the manuals for n Achievement
(Atkinson, 1958), n Power (Winter, 1973), and n Intimacy
(McAdams, 1984).

Each motive was scored by a different

trained scorer who had previously achieved acceptable
agreement with expert scoring, both in terms of overall
inter-rater reliability (i.e., 2=.86 or over) and category
agreement in motive imagery (86% or over).

The above

three TAT measures exhibit internal consistencies that
fall below the range accepted by traditional psychometric
standards.

In the case of n Achievement, for example,

average inter-story correlations of .12 and .15 have been
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obtained--both of which were nonsignificant (Biernat,
1989).

As discussed by Atkinson (1981) and McClelland

(1980), however, there are solid, construct-based, as
opposed to measurement error-based, reasons why
homogeneity estimates for TAT measures should be low.
Test-retest reliabilities for the above three TAT measures
are also typically low, ranging from .10 to .35
(McClelland, 1980).

As noted earlier, however, these

figures can be significantly increased when the
variability demands tacit in standard TAT instructions are
removed; explicit instructions that subjects may fully or
partially reproduce previously written TAT stories result
in enhanced reliability estimates.

In the case of n

Power, Winter and Stewart (1977) obtained

an~

of .58,

over a 6-8 day testing interval, while Lundy, as cited in
McAdams (1982), obtained
year retest delay).

an~

of .48 for n Intimacy (one-

Similar figures have been documented

for n Achievement (Heckhausen et al., 1985).

All three

motive measures have been extensively validated, as
outlined earlier.
Autobiographical and striving data were submitted to
thematic analysis as well.

Subjects' early memories and

peak experiences, taken from the Guided Autobiography
form, were scored according to McAdams'
communion coding system.

(1990) agency and

This process culminated in a
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single, overall autobiographical agency and
autobiographical communion score for each subject.
Striving lists, on the other hand, were scored for five of
Emmons'

(1988) striving categories:

Independence,
Interpersonal.

§

Power,

§

2 Self-Sufficiency/

Achievement, 2 Intimacy, and

§

Actually, final scores for the first four

of these striving dimensions reflect the quotient of the
number of category-relevant strivings divided by the
number of strivings provided.

Final scores for

§

Interpersonal, the fifth striving dimension, express the
ratio of interpersonal-to-intrapersonal strivings.
Both Guided Autobiography responses and striving lists
were independently scored by the experimenter and an
assistant.

Following this independent scoring, scoring

discrepancies were discussed and resolved, such that each
subject received one final score for each autobiographical
or striving index.

Both autobiographical and striving

instruments are experimental measures for which no
published internal consistency or test-retest reliability
data is available.

As already noted, both exhibit

substantial face validity.

CHAPTER VII
RESULTS
variable Formation
Composite measures of various mediator and motive
variables were obtained through the summation of relevant
facet measures.

Composite inner- and other-directedness

measure formation followed Wymer and Penner's (1985)
factor analytically informed guidelines.

Specifically,

inner-directedness was operationalized as the T-score
average of the Personal Identity Scale and the SCS'
Private Self-Consciousness subscale.

The T-scores from

the SVS and the SMS Other Focus subscale were likewise
averaged to yield a measure of other-directedness.
Furthermore, the T-scores for 1) BSRI Masculinity and ACL
Agency, and 2) BSRI Femininity and ACL Communion were
averaged to yield composite measures of san Agency and san
Communion, respectively.

In addition to being

conceptually justified (see Table 1, p. 115), these latter
combinations were supported by obtained correlational
patterns:
Agency,

~

BSRI Masculinity correlated strongly with ACL
(119)

=

.78, 2 < .001, and BSRI Femininity

correlated substantially with ACL Communion,
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~

(119)

=
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.58, R < .001.

Correlational analyses of agentic/communal implicit
and striving measures revealed a weak and inconsistent
pattern of interrelation.

The average correlation between

n Achievement, n Power, and autobiographical agency was
extremely low, rho= .15.

In the realm of implicit

communion, n Intimacy and autobiographical communion
correlated at rho = -.08, ns.

Similarly, the average

correlation between the three agentic strivings was rho =
.03, while§ Intimacy and§ Interpersonal correlated
modestly, rho (128) = .28, 2 < .01.

Especially in the

case of the implicit motive measures, these results are
not surprising.

First, the autobiographical tasks

immediately followed TAT administration, such that a
subject's reported peak experience and early memory could
be viewed as responses to (imaginary) "TAT cards 7 and 8. 11
In lieu of the internal consistency figures typically
obtained for TAT

n

Achievement, D Power, and

n

Intimacy

measures, these two latter "stories" would not be expected
to relate to the others strongly.

On a similar note, the

abridged autobiographical agency and communion measures
employed in the present study can be likened to two-item
tests: alone, they represent too small a sampling of
operant behavior to overcome the sampling error associated
with each response.

However, they can, when combined with

other operant responses, contribute meaningfully to a
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larger instrument's overall validity.

To the degree that

personal strivings share some of the attributes of
implicit motives, the obtained weak pattern of intercategory relationships between agentic (and communal)
strivings is also not surprising.
Despite the low level of empirical relationship
within implicit motive and striving domains, implicit
motive and striving variables were nonetheless combined,
via averaged sums of

~-scores,

to yield composite agentic

and communal measures (for a listing of various relevant
facet measures, see Table 1, p. 115).

Hence, n Agency

reflects the average of n Achievement, n Power, and
autobiographical agency, while n Communion reflects the
average of n Intimacy and autobiographical communion.
Composite measures of g Agency and g Communion are
composed respectively of the following averages: g
Achievement, g Power, and g Self-Sufficiency/Independence,
and g Intimacy and g Interpersonal.

It is expected that

the by combining larger numbers of observations, more
valid and more reliable striving and implicit motive
indices will be obtained.
For each of the five investigative hypotheses,
analyses were conducted on both circumscribed and
composite motive dimensions.

Similarly, striving

hypotheses were tested using both single and composite
striving indices.

For the sake of both brevity and
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clarity, however, the ensuing report focuses exclusively
on findings for composite motive and/or striving
dimensions.

Results for single motive and/or striving

dimensions were generally nonsignificant.
Preliminary Intercorrelations
As a prelude to the empirical examination of
investigative hypotheses, the baseline pattern of
implicit/self-attributed motive relationship was examined
via correlational analyses.

Since n Agency and n

Communion scores were highly skewed, the assumption of
normality prerequisite to use of the Pearson productmoment correlation coefficient could not be met.

Instead,

the Spearman rank correlation coefficient (rho), a
nonparametric correlational technique, was employed.

The

results of these analyses, conducted on overall, female,
and male samples, are summarized in Table 2.

In the

overall sample, moderate positive correlations between n
Agency and san Agency, rho (109)

=

.22, Q < .05, and n

Communion and san Communion, rho (104)
were obtained.

=

.22, Q < .05,

This general pattern, however, held in

neither male nor female subsamples.

Instead, contrasexual

motives showed moderate to substantial associations, while
gender-consistent motives were unrelated.

For males, n

Communion correlated positively with san Communion, rho
(44)

=

.43, Q < .01, while n Agency and san Agency failed
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Table 2.--Baseline Correlations Between Implicit and SelfAttributed Motive Variables in Overall, Male, and Female
Samples

SelfAttributed overall rn:=104 >
Motive
Variables
Il Ag
Il Cm
san Ag

22*

san Cm

05

-10
22*

Males rn:=44 >

Females rn:=59)
Il Cm

Il Ag

Il Cm

06

05

36**

00

43**

19 8

08

-06

Il Ag

Note.
san Ag = Composite self-attributed agency measure.
san Cm = Composite self-attributed communion measure.
n. Ag = Composite implicit agency measure. n. Cm =
Composite implicit communion measure. The N cited for
each sample reflects the lowest N associated with a single
correlational pairing within that sample's correlational
block; variations between Ns within the same correlational
block reflect inconsistencies in the amount of missing
data associated with different correlational variables.
a= 2 < .10

*2 < .05

**2 < .01

***2 < .001.

Decimals omitted.

to interrelate, rho (50) = .06, 2 = ns.
the other hand,

n.

For females, on

Agency and san Agency evidenced a

positive relationship, rho (59) = .36, 2 < .01, but

n.

Communion and san Communion did not, rho (60) = .08, ns.
Mediation of Implicit/Self-Attributed Motive Relationships
by Inner-Directedness
Preliminary considerations.

As a prelude to the

testing of investigative hypotheses, subjects were divided
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into high and low inner-directedness groups.

For overall,

male, and female samples, these divisions were based upon
median splits.

Respective medians for these three samples

were 49.85, 48.69, and 50.84; respective distribution
ranges were 39.54, 39.54, and 35.94.

The decision to

divide male and female samples based on within-sample
medians rather than the overall median followed from a few
considerations.

First, the division of male and female

samples based on the overall median resulted in lopsided
Hs between low inner-directedness and high innerdirectedness groups.

This lopsidedness in turn would have

interacted with diminutive male and female sample sizes to
seriously compromise statistical power.

Dividing male and

female samples according to within-sample medians, then,
maximized statistical power.

Admittedly, this sort of

division hampers the generalizability of obtained withingender findings to an overall population of people high or
low in inner-directedness (e.g., some of the females
classified as "low inner-directedness'' in the female
sample might actually fall in the "high innerdirectedness" group in the overall sample and in the
population which the overall sample represents).

However,

the present investigation is more concerned with the

relative effects of higher and lower inner-directedness
rather than with the absolute effects of high and low
inner-directedness.

Hence, the issue of intersample
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noncomparability is less problematic.
Agency.

The hypothesis that inner-directedness

enhances agentic motive congruence was supported for
neither overall, male, nor female samples.

As a first

step in hypothesis testing, a series of nonparametric n
Agency /

san Agency correlation coefficients was computed.

Specifically, values were computed for high and low innerdirectedness groups from overall, male, and female
samples.

Tables 3 and 4 allow for the visual comparison

of various correlational magnitudes.

In the overall

sample, n Agency and san Agency were essentially unrelated
for high inner-directedness subjects, rho (56)

=

-.07, ns,

while the two were substantially related for low innerdirectedness subjects, rho (49)

=

pattern was obtained for females.

.45, 2 < .01.

A similar

Specifically, high

inner-directedness was related to a marginal intermotive
association, rho (29)

=

.27, 2 < .10,

while low inner-

directedness was related to a substantial positive
correlation, rho (27)

=

.45, 2 < .01.

In the case of

males, high inner-directedness was actually related to
patent motive discordance, rho (25) = -.50, 2 <
.01, while low inner-directedness was associated with a
degree of motive accordance markedly above males'
aforementioned nonsignificant baseline intermotive
correlation, rho (24) = .43, 2 < .05.
While visual analysis of various correlational
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Table 3.--correlations Between Implicit and SelfAttributed Motive Variables for High and Low InnerDirectedness Subjects in Overall Sample

---------------------------------------------------------SelfAttributed
Motive
Variables

High ID CH=52)
Il Ag

n Cm

san Ag

-07

-11

san Cm

13

Low ID CH=49)
n Ag
45**

18 8

-22a

n Cm
-09
37**

Note. High ID = Above median on composite innerdirectedness measure. Low ID = At or below median on
composite inner-directedness measure. san Ag = Composite
self-attributed agency measure.
san Cm = Composite selfattributed communion measure. n Ag = Composite implicit
agency measure. n Cm = Composite implicit communion
measure. The H cited for each sample reflects the lowest
H associated with a single correlational pairing within
that sample's correlational block; variations between Hs
within the same correlational block reflect
inconsistencies in the amount of missing data associated
with different correlational variables.
a

= R < .10

*R < .05

**R < .01

***R < .001.

Decimals omitted.

magnitudes consistently suggests an unpredicted
relationship between inner-directedness and decreased
motive congruence, statistical analysis supports this
relationship only in the case of men.

For each subject, a

discrepancy score was computed by taking the absolute
value of the difference between n Agency and san Agency
scores.

Mean discrepancy scores for high and low inner-

T-
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Table 4.--correlations Between Implicit and SelfAttributed Motive Variables for High and Low InnerDirectedness Subjects in Male and Female Samples

Males

Females
Low ID
(N=24)

SelfAttributed
Motive
Variables

High ID
rn:=20>
n Ag

san Ag

-50**

31 a

san Cm

-01

54** -27

n cm

n

Ag

43*

n

Low ID
(N=27)

High ID
(N=29)

em n

Ag

n cm

-07

27 8

-19

48**

12

14

n Ag

n em

45**

25

15

08

Note. High ID = Above median on composite innerdirectedness measure. Low ID = At or below median on
composite inner-directedness measure. san Ag = Composite
self-attributed agency measure. san Cm = Composite selfattributed communion measure. n Ag = Composite implicit
agency measure. n Cm = Composite implicit communion
measure. The N cited for each sample reflects the lowest
N associated with a single correlational pairing within
that sample's correlational block; variations between Ns
within the same correlational block reflect
inconsistencies in the amount of missing data associated
with different correlational variables.
a

= R < .10

*R < .05

**R < .01

***R < .001.

Decimals omitted.

directedness groups were then compared using the MannWhitney (MW) test for two independent samples.

The

average discrepancy score for high inner-directedness
subjects did not differ significantly from that for low
inner-directedness subjects in either overall, MW
(49,54) = -1.41, ns, or female, MW

~z

~z

(27,28) = -.22, ns,
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samples.

For males, however, low inner-directedness

subjects evidenced marginally less discrepancy than did
high inner-directedness subjects, MW Qz (24,25) = -1.92, 2
< .10.

Communion.

As in the case of agency, communal

intermotive correlations (i.e., n Communion with san
Communion) suggest a counterintuitive relationship between
inner-directedness and motive congruence (see Tables 3 and
4).

In the overall sample, n Communion and san Communion

were only marginally related for high inner-directedness
subjects, rho (52)

=

.18, 2 < .10, while the two were

moderately and significantly related for low innerdirectedness subjects, rho (49) = .37, 2 < .01.
Furthermore, low inner-directedness subjects, in
comparison with those high in inner-directedness, had a
significantly smaller intermotive discrepancy score, MW
(49,50)

=

~z

-2.10, 2 < .05.

Visual comparison of correlational data for the male
sample suggests an absence of any sort of innerdirectedness effect (see Table 4).

However, statistical

comparison of average discrepancy scores for high and low
inner-directedness males reveals a significant difference,
MW Qz (24,20)

=

-2.26, 2 < .05.

Males below median in

inner-directedness show more n Communion - san Communion
congruence than above-median males.

In the case of

females, both visual comparison of correlational data and
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statistical comparison of average discrepancy scores
suggests the absence of an inner-directedness effect, MW
Qz

(27,29)

=

-.19, ns.

Mediation of Implicit/Self-Attributed Motive Relationships
by Other-Directedness
Preliminary considerations.

Median splits were

employed to divide subjects into various high and low
other-directedness groups.

Respective medians for other-

directedness in overall, male, and female samples were
50.74, 48.33, and 51.48, while the respective ranges were
33.97, 33.97, and 31.23.

Median splits for male and

female samples employed within-sample medians, rather than
the overall median.

This decision followed from the same

considerations advanced in regard to inner-directedness.
Specifically, within-sample median splits ensure
relatively equal Ns between high and low otherdirectedness groups.

Hence, within-sample median splits

maximize statistical power.

Additionally, the present

study is primarily concerned with the differential effects
of relatively higher levels and relatively lower levels of
other-directedness; the generalizability of obtained
findings to distinct, normatively defined high and low
other-directedness populations, which within-sample median
splits hinder, is of secondary importance.
Agency.

The hypothesis that low other-directedness
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is related to enhanced congruence between n Agency and san
Agency was not supported for overall and male samples.
Mann-Whitney analyses revealed a lack of significant
difference between average intermotive discrepancy scores
in the overall sample, MW
male sample, MW

~z

~z

(51,54) = .17, ns, and in the

Comparison of n

(22,25) = 1.49, ns.

Agency - san Agency correlations also suggests the absence
of a notable other-directedness effect (see Tables 5 and
6).

In the overall sample, agentic intermotive

correlations for high and low other-directedness subjects
were of the same general magnitude; respective values were
rho (56)

=

.27, 2 < .05, and rho (49)

=

.14, ns.

Similarly, intermotive correlations were weak and
nonsignificant for high and low other-directedness males.
In the case of females, results are inconclusive.
Statistical comparison of average discrepancy scores for
high and low other-directedness groups is consistent with
the investigative hypotheses:

females low in other-

directedness evidence marginally less inter-motive
discrepancy than do females high in other-directedness, MW
~z

(29,30) = -1.53, 2 < .10.

However, this relationship

is not supported correlationally (see Table 6).
Specifically, n Agency and san Agency correlate moderately
and positively for high other-directedness females, rho

(30)

=

.36, g < .05, while correlating nonsignificantly

for females low in other-directedness, rho (49) = .20, ns.
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Table 5.--Correlations Between Implicit and SelfAttributed Motive Variables for High and Low OtherDirectedness Subjects in overall Sample

SelfAttributed
Motive
Variables

High OD rn:=54)

Low OD (.li=48)

n Ag

n Cm

n Ag

n Cm

san Ag

27*

01

14

-29*

san Cm

20 8

13

-15

32*

Note. High OD = Above median on composite otherdirectedness measure. Low OD = At or below median on
composite other-directedness measure.
san Ag = Composite
self-attributed agency measure. san Cm = Composite selfattributed communion measure. n Ag = Composite implicit
agency measure. n Cm = Composite implicit communion
measure. The .li cited for each sample reflects the lowest
.li associated with a single correlational pairing within
that sample's correlational block; variations between Hs
within the same correlational block reflect
inconsistencies in the amount of missing data associated
with different correlational variables.
a

= R < .10

*R < .05

**R < .01

***R < .001.

Decimals omitted.

Given the small sample sizes associated with these two
correlational figures, the difference in magnitudes is
probably negligible; it is, however, clear that females
low in other-directedness show no enhanced correlational
intermotive congruence relative to high other-directedness
females.

In conclusion, then, the confirmatory Mann-

Whitney finding is somewhat mitigated by nonsupportive
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Table 6.--correlations Between Implicit and selfAttributed Motive Variables for High and Low OtherDirectedness Subjects in Male and Female Samples

Males
SelfAttributed
Motive
Variables

High OD
rn:=24 >

n

Ag

n

Females
Low OD
rn:=1a>

Cm

san Ag

13

14

san Cm

12

43*

n

Ag
10

-37*

n

Low OD
CN=29)

High OD
(N=30)
Cm

-06
54*

n Ag

n Cm

n

Ag

n

Cm

36*

-09

20

04

23

-14

04

20

Note. High OD = Above median on composite otherdirectedness measure. Low OD = At or below median on
composite other-directedness measure.
san Ag = Composite
self-attributed agency measure. san Cm = Composite selfattributed communion measure. n Ag = Composite implicit
agency measure. n Cm = Composite implicit communion
measure. The N cited for each sample reflects the lowest
N associated with a single correlational pairing within
that sample's correlational block; variations between Ns
within the same correlational block reflect
inconsistencies in the amount of missing data associated
with different correlational variables.
a

= Q < .10

*R < .05

**R < .01

***R < .001.

Decimals omitted.

correlational data:

support for other-directedness'

negative effect on agentic motive congruence is limited.
Communion.

In the overall sample, low and high

other-directedness groups did not differ significantly in

n Communion - san Communion discrepancy, although
differences were in the predicted direction, MW

~z

(48,52)
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=

-.23, ns.

Visual comparison of interrnotive correlations

additionally suggests some degree of other-directedness
effect (see Table 5):

n Communion and san Communion

correlate significantly and positively for low otherdirectedness subjects, rho (48)

=

.32, 2 < .05, while they

failed to do so for high other-directedness subjects, rho
(54)

=

.13, ns.

Hence, both correlational and Mann-

Whitney data suggest a low-level, nonsignificant otherdirectedness effect in the predicted direction.
Inconsistent and divergent other-directedness effects
were obtained in both male and female subsamples.

In the

case of females, other-directedness' predicted,
detrimental effect on n Communion - san Communion
congruence was supported.

Low other-directedness females

evidenced marginally less intermotive discrepancy than did
high other-directedness females, MW

< .10.

~z

(30,30)

=

-1.49, 2

It is notable, however, that even for females low

in other-directedness, n Communion and san Communion were
not significantly intercorrelated, rho (30) = .20, ns.
The other-directedness effect obtained for males was the
reverse of that predicted:

high other-directedness males

show less interrnotive discrepancy than do low otherdirectedness males, MW

~z

(18,23)

=

1.97, p < .05.

However, this unpredicted result was not supported
correlationally (see Table 6):

n Communion and san

Communion correlate at the same order of magnitude for
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high other-directedness males, rho (24) = .43, 2 < .05,
and low other-directedness males, rho (18)

=

.54, 2 < .05.

combined Mediational Effects of Inner-Directedness and
Other-Directedness
Due to the extreme skewedness of

n Agency and n

communion scores, the assumption of normality prerequisite
to the use of ANOVAs could not be met.

As a less

definitive alternative to ANOVAs, the hypothesis that high
inner-directedness and low other-directedness maximize
intermotive correspondence was examined correlationally
(see Table 7).

Specifically, subjects were divided, via

median split, into four groups based on their level of
inner-directedness and other-directedness.
were as follows:

The groups

H/H (high inner-directedness; high

other-directedness), H/L (high inner-directedness; low
other-directedness), L/H (low inner-directedness; high
other-directedness), and L/L (low on both inner- and
other-directedness).
The prediction that H/L subjects would evidence
enhanced intermotive congruence was generally not
supported (see Table 7).

In the case of agency, L/H

subjects evidenced the highest degree of n Agency - san
Agency correspondence, rho (27) = .47, 2 < .01, followed
by L/L subjects, rho (22) = .25, ns.

Agentic intermotive

correspondence was essentially negligible for H/L
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Table 7.--Correlations Between Implicit and SelfAttributed Motive Variables for Various InnerDirectedness/Other-Directedness Groups

---------------------------------------------------------SelfAttributed H/H rn:=24>
Motive
variables n Ag !l Cm

!l Ag

!l CM

san Ag

-06

-15

-04

-24

san Cm

24

-04

01

H/L (N=26)

L/H (N=27)
!l Ag

47**

29 8

-07

L/L (N=22)

n Cm

D Ag

!l Cm

21

25

-44*

40*

-50**

41*

Note. H/H = Above-median on inner- and otherdirectedness. H/L = Above-median on inner-directedness
and below-median on other-directedness. L/H = Belowmedian on inner-directedness and above-median on otherdirectedness. L/L = Below-median on inner- and otherdirectedness. san Ag = Composite self-attributed agency
measure. san Cm = Composite self-attributed communion
measure. n. Ag = Composite implicit agency measure. n. Cm =
Composite implicit communion measure. The N cited for
each sample reflects the lowest H associated with a single
correlational pairing within that sample's correlational
block; variations between Ns within the same correlational
block reflect inconsistencies in the amount of missing
data associated with different correlational variables.
a

= Q < .10

*R < .05

**R < .01

***R < .001.

Decimals omitted.

subjects, rho (28) = -.04, ns, and H/H subjects, rho (26)
= -.06, ns.
communion.

The same pattern was evident in the case of
Again, L/H and L/L subjects showed the highest

degree of intermotive correlation:

respective values for

the groups were rho (27) = .40, R < .05, and rho (22) =

147
.41, p < .05.

The magnitude of communal intermotive

relationship was only somewhat smaller for H/L subjects,
rho (26)

=

.29, p < .10, while it was negligible for H/H

subjects, rho (24) = -.04, ns.

In summary, these results

seem to suggest a main effect for inner-directedness
rather than an inner-directedness X other-directedness
interaction.

Contrary to predictions, then, low inner-

directedness is related to enhanced intermotive
congruence, regardless of level of other-directedness.
Unfortunately, low Ns precluded a meaningful analysis of
male and female samples.
Comparative Relationships of Personalitv Abilities and
Self-Attributed Motives to the Implicit Domain
Agency.

The general hypothesis that agentic

personality abilities (£Agency), assessed via the BMAX,
would relate more strongly to n Agency than would BSRIassessed san Agency was tested via nonparametric analyses.
This statistical decision followed from n Agency's highly
skewed distribution.

Each subject was assigned an

operant-respondent discrepancy score (i.e., the absolute
value of the difference between n Agency and san Agency Tscores) and an operant-ability discrepancy score (i.e.,
the absolute value of the difference between n Agency and
g Agency T-scores) .

Differences between mean operant-

respondent and operant-ability discrepancy scores were
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then tested via the Wilcoxon Matched-Pairs Signed-Ranks
Test, a nonparametric analog to the t-test.
Hypotheses were supported for neither overall, male,
nor female samples.

More specifically, the Wilcoxon

Matched-Pairs Signed Ranks Test yielded nonsignif icant
results in each case.

Respective values for overall,

male, and female samples were as follows:
-.30, ns, WX Tz (49)
ns.

WX Tz (108)

=

= -.72, ns, and WX Tz (59) = -.22,

It is however notable that mean differences were in

the correct direction in all three cases.

Nonsignificant

group differences were further examined via Spearman rank
correlation coefficients (rho), computed for n Agency .§.fill

Agency and for n Agency - ft Agency.

The results of

these correlational analyses, conducted on overall, male,
and female samples, are presented in Table 8.

Again, ft

Agency was more highly correlated with n Agency than was
san Agency in all three samples.

Hence, group differences

consistently fell in predicted directions, although they
were not significant.
Communion.

A series of analyses analogous to those

conducted for agency was conducted for communion.

This

time, san Communion was operationalized as BSRI Femininity
to ensure item comparability with the BSRI-derived BMAX
measure of ft Communion.

The Wilcoxon Matched-Pairs

Signed-Ranks Test was used to compare n Communion - san
Communion and n Communion - ft Communion difference scores.
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Table 8.--Comparatve Correlations of Self-Attributed
Motives and Personality Abilities with Implicit Motives
in Overall, Male, and Female Samples

Overall rn:=105)
Motive
Variables

Il Ag

Females rn:=6o)

n Cm

n Cm

Il Ag

n Cm

-10

06

09

32**

28*

07

44***

14

41**

18 8

01

24*

22*

20 8

san Ag

21*

s

34*** -01

Ag

Males rn:=44 >

san Cm

04

19*

a Cm

17*

23**

-05
12

Il Ag

-05

Note.
san Ag = BSRI Masculinity scale. ,a Ag = BMAXassessed agentic personality abilities.
san Cm = BSRI
communion scale. ,a Cm = BMAX-assessed communal
personality abilities. n Ag = Composite implicit agency
measure. n Cm = Composite implicit communion measure.
The N cited for each sample reflects the lowest N
associated with a single correlational pairing within that
sample's correlational block; variations between Ns within
the same correlational block reflect inconsistencies in
the amount of missing data associated with different
correlational variables.
8

= 2 < .10

*2 < .05

**2 < .01

***2 < .001.

Decimals omitted.

As in the case of agency, hypotheses were supported in
neither overall, male, nor female samples.
values for the three groups were WX
WX

~z

(43) = .18, ns, and WX

~z

~z

The respective

(103) = -.39, ns,

(60) = -.56, ns.

Relevant

correlational follow-up analyses, the results of which

appear in Table a, were also implemented.

In the case of
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females, results were in the predicted direction:

g

communion was more strongly correlated with n Communion,
rho {61)
=

=

.20, 2 < .10, than was san communion, rho {61)

.01, ns, though apparently not at a significant level.

Visual analysis of the male sample suggests a
nonsignificant opposing trend, such that san Communion is
more highly related to n Communion, rho (44) = .41, 2 <
.01, than is g Communion, rho (48) = .24, 2 < .05.

For

the overall sample, differences between correlational
magnitudes were negligible.
Personal Strivings and the Bi-Level Motivational System
The twin hypotheses that (1) strivings are more
closely related to implicit motives than are selfattributed motives and (2) strivings are more closely
related to self-attributed motives than are implicit
motives were both tested via a series of Wilcoxon MatchedPairs Signed-Ranks tests.

This decision followed from

both implicit motives' and personal strivings' routinely
skewed distributions.

Wilcoxon (WX) comparisons were made

between pairs of discrepancy scores, which reflected the
absolute value of various T-score differences.

In the

case of agency, for example, §Agency/ n Agency and §
Agency/san Agency discrepancy scores were compared to an n
Agency/san Agency discrepancy baseline.

A comparable

series of comparisons were made in the case of communion.
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Relative alignments of strivings and self-attributed
motives with implicit motives.

The hypothesis that

strivings are more closely related to implicit motives
than are self-attributed motives received some support in
the case of agency.

As predicted, g Agency was more

closely related to n Agency than was .fil!Il Agency, WX Tz
(109)

=

-2.84, p < .01.

Furthermore, this relationship

held for both males, WX Tz (51)
females, WX Tz (58)

=

=

-2.29, p < .05, and

-1.83, p < .10.

It is notable that

these confirmatory relationships were not evident in
correlational analyses, which are more sensitive to
extreme scores (see Table 9).

For the male sample, g

Agency - n Agency and san Agency - n Agency correlations
were extremely weak and nonsignificant.

Visual inspection

of the female sample suggests that if anything, san Agency
is more strongly related to n Agency, rho (59)
.01, than is g Agency, rho (62)
The prediction that

§

=

=

.36, 12 <

.09, ns.

Communion would relate more

strongly to n Communion than would san Communion was
supported in neither overall, male, nor female samples.
In all three cases, Wilcoxon comparisons yielded
nonsignificant results that were, however, in the correct
direction.

Respective values for overall, male, and

female samples were WX Tz (104) = -.77, ns, WX Tz (45)
-.74, ns, and WX Tz (59) = -.27, ns.

Parallel

correlational analyses mirrored Wilcoxon results for

=
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Table 9.--comparatve Correlations of Self-Attributed
Motives and Personal Strivings with Implicit Motives in
Overall, Male, and Female Samples

Overall rn:=104 >
Motive
variables

Il Ag

Males (N=44)

n Cm

Il Ag

n Cm

san Ag

22*

-10

06

05

.§. Ag

07

-22**

05

-01

san Cm

05

22*

Cm

12 8

03

§?

-06
07

Females (N=59)
Il Ag

n Cm

36**

00

09

-22*

43**

19 8

08

20 8

18 8

-09

Note.
san Ag = Composite self-attributed agency measure •
.§. Ag = Composite striving agency measure.
san Cm =
Composite self-attributed communion measure. .§. cm =
Composite striving communion measure. n Ag = composite
implicit agency measure. n Cm = Composite implicit
communion measure. The N cited for each sample reflects
the lowest N associated with a single correlational
pairing within that sample's correlational block;
variations between Ns within the same correlational block
reflect inconsistencies in the amount of missing data
associated with different correlational variables.
a= R < .10

*R < .05

**R < .01

***R < .001.

Decimals omitted.

females but not for males (see Table 9). For females, n
Communion was equally unrelated to both san Communion, rho
(60) = .08, ns, and.§. Communion, rho (62) = -.09, ns.

For

males, however, n Communion was substantially more related
to san Communion, rho (44) = .43, R < .01, than to .§.
Communion, rho (57) = .20, R < .10.
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Relative alignments of strivings and implicit motives
with self-attributed motives.

The prediction that g

Agency would be more closely aligned with san Agency than
would n Agency was supported only in the case of males,
where a marginally significant effect in the correct
direction was obtained, WX Tz (51) = -1.29, p < .10.
Visual inspection of correlational data further suggests
that strivings may be more strongly related to san Agency
than implicit motives for males (see Table 10) :

g Agency

and san Agency correlate moderately and significantly, rho
(58)

=

.29, 2 < .05, while n Agency and san Agency do not,

rho (50)

=

.06, ns.

For females, a significant effect in

the opposite direction was obtained, such that n Agency
was more closely aligned with san Agency than was g
agency, WX Tz (58)

=

-2.20, p < .05.

This

counterintuitive relationship was also supported
correlationally, where the n Agency - san Agency
correlation was sizable and significant, rho (59)

=

.36, 2

< .01, and the g Agency - san Agency relationship was
negligible, rho {62) = .02, ns.

The divergent

relationships associated with female and male subsamples
combined to produce a nonsignif icant effect in the overall
sample, WX Tz (109) = -.57, ns.
The hypothesis that g Communion would relate more
strongly to san Communion than would

n

Communion received

support in the female sample, WX Tz (59)

=

-1.44, 2 < .10.
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Table 10.--Comparatve Correlations of Implicit Motives
and Personal Strivings with Self-Attributed Motives in
Overall, Male, and Female Samples

Overall (!!=104)
Motive
Variables

n Ag
§.

Ag

n Cm
§.

Cm

san Ag

san Cm

Males (!!=44)
san Ag

Females (!!=59)

san Cm

san Ag

san Cm

22*

05

06

-06

36**

19 8

22**

01

29*

-04

02

09

22*

05

43**

00

08

47***

13

38**

27*

54***

-10
19*

Note.
san Ag = Composite self-attributed agency measure.
Ag = Composite striving agency measure. san Cm =
Composite self-attributed communion measure. §. Cm =
Composite striving communion measure. n Ag = Composite
implicit agency measure. n cm = Composite implicit
communion measure. The N cited for each sample reflects
the lowest N associated with a single correlational
pairing within that sample's correlational block;
variations between Ns within the same correlational block
reflect inconsistencies in the amount of missing data
associated with different correlational variables.

§.

a

= 2 < .10

*R < .05

**R < .01

***R < .001.

Decimals omitted.

Actually, this effect appears quite robust when viewed
correlationally (see Table 10).

While n Communion and san

Communion were essentially unrelated, rho (60) = .08, ns,
.e_

Communion and san Communion were substantially related,

rho (63) = .54, 2 < .001.

For males, communal strivings

and implicit motives were equally related to

.§..9..D.
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Communion, WX Tz (45)

=

-.40, ns.

Correlational analysis

further corroborates this conclusion:

san Communion is

moderately related to both n Communion, rho (44)
< ;01,

and~

Communion, rho (57)

=

.43, Q

=

.38, Q < .01.

The

striving effect observed in the female sample was
reflected in a marginally significant, confirmatory
striving effect in the overall sample, WX Tz (104)

=

-1.37, p < .10, which was also supported correlationally.

CHAPTER VIII
DISCUSSION
Motive Congruence Revisited: Baseline Relationships
Between Implicit and Self-Attributed Motives
The present investigation sought to gain support for
a particular explanation for a well-documented problem.
The problem, simply stated, is that operant and respondent
measures of the same motive content "seldom correlate
significantly with one another" {McClelland et al., 1989,
p. 691).

By showing that operant and respondent motive

measures do in fact relate for people high and/or low in
certain conceptually relevant variables, the present
investigation aimed to empirically bolster McClelland et
al.'s {1989) construct-based explanation for this lack of
intermeasure relationship.

Their account contends that

overall, operant and respondent motive measures are
unrelated, because the implicit and self-attributed motive
systems that they respectively tap are normatively out of
alignment.

This explanation stands in opposition to the

measure-based explanations of Entwisle {1972), Raven
(1988), and others, which implicate psychometric
shortcomings of operant or respondent measures as the
culprit for motive incongruity.
156

157

Undoubtedly, the most important finding of the
present investigation concerns McClelland et al.'s (1989)
assumption of a normative lack of intermotive
relationship.

This assumption, in short, is not supported

by the current data.

For both males and females,

contrasexual implicit and self-attributed motive systems
showed an unexpectedly high degree of correspondence.

In

the case of males, n Communion and san communion
displayed a substantial positive association.

Similarly,

n Agency and san Agency were appreciably interrelated for
females.

Gender-congruent implicit and self-attributed

motive systems, on the other hand, evidenced the
negligible degree of interrelationship that would be
expected based upon prior research.
The unexpected pattern of obtained results warrants
two types of explanation.

First, the failure of this sort

of pattern to surf ace in previous research must be
addressed, and second, the pattern itself must be
interpreted.

In regard to the former, it is noteworthy

that the present investigation employed composite implicit
and self-attributed motive measures, where past
investigations have examined only single motive facets,
such as n Intimacy or san Power.

Undoubtedly, the

combination of many more observations into single
composite measures yielded more valid implicit and selfattributed motive measures.

The enhanced validity, in
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turn, probably allowed for the apprehension of a
relationship previously obscured by substantial random
error.

This explanation is particularly germane to

implicit motive measurement, as the popular TAT measures
typically sample only a very small portion of operant
behavior (i.e., six imaginative stories).

The above

speculations are upheld by analysis of operant and
respondent facet intercorrelations:

correlational

pairings of single operant with single respondent facets
generally yielded positive relationships of negligible
magnitude.

It appears, then, that measure-based

explanations for implicit and self-attributed motive
measures' lack of interrelation are somewhat on target, as
the more comprehensive assessment of operant behavior and
respondent behavior brings into relief previously
concealed interrnotive patterns.

Alternately, the obtained

pattern of baseline intermotive relationships may be
understood as a fluke, although the occurrence of the same
pattern in independent male and female samples (i.e.,
contrasexual motive interelatedness; gender-consistent
motive unrelatedness) renders this explanation unlikely.
Although unpredicted, the obtained intermotive
relationships actually make sense upon scrutiny.

However,

before explanations can be advanced, some basic
distinctions between the two motivational systems must be
reiterated.

The implicit motivational system can be
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likened to Freud's (1962) id, Winnicott's (1965) True Self,
and Rogers'

(1963) directional organismic processes,

or organismic self:

implicit motives constitute a basic,

true psychic reality--a set of phenomenological
coordinates to which the conscious personality must in
some way adapt, whether through expression, repression,
dissociation, or denial.

The implicit system,

furthermore, is largely inherited and constitutional,
although life experiences can facilitate the
crystallization of inherent motivational potentials into
formal motive dispositions (McClelland & Pilon, 1983).
While the implicit system represents constitutional
nature, the self-attributed system reflects internalized
nurture, much like the psychodynamic ego and superego
(Freud, 1933).

In the normative case, then, the self-

attributed system reflects parental-societal standards as
they pertain to personal identity.

The crucial point for

the purposes of the present discussion is that these
standards differ in content and emphasis for men and
women; men are taught to be agentic, or masculine, and
women are taught to be communal, or feminine (Birns, 1976;
Block, 1976; Brooks-Gunn & Matthews, 1979; Edwards &
Whiting, 1983).

While individual parents certainly vary

in their espousal and subsequent inculcation of sex-typed
versus androgenous gender roles, it is nonetheless clear
that overall, men and women receive very different
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messages as to who they are and who they should be.
The obtained pattern of {l) gender-congruent motive
non-relation, and (2) contrasexual motive co-relation
makes sense when considered against the above conceptual
backdrop.

Boys acquire comprehensive, differentiated

agentic self-attributed motives and girls acquire
similarly extensive, articulated communal self-attributed
motives.

Furthermore, these gender-congruent self-

attributed motives are based in pat social ideologies,
rather than in personal motivational idiosyncrasies.

By

definition, then, they will normatively be somewhat
misaligned with the individual's implicit motivational
make-up, as was evident in the present investigation.

It

is also probable that boys and girls receive much less
explicit training in regard to contrasexual aspects of
identity.

In other words, boys receive comparatively little

explicit information, reward, or punishment in
connection with being or not being nurturant, intimate,
and connected; girls likewise receive relatively less
explicit shaping in regard to dominance, autonomy, and
achievement.

While these latter two premises may sound

somewhat dated, it is notable that the parents of the
participants in the present study received their sex-role
training in the 1950s.

If the above assumptions are

correct, then the development of contrasexual self-
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attributed motives should be less related to the
internalization of parental-societal imperatives that
McClelland et al.

(1989) postulate.

Instead, self-

attributed motive acquisition should follow from the
gradual, verbal representation of experienced implicit
realities.

Such a process would result in a much higher

degree of intermotive correspondence, as was obtained.
Alternately, it may be that in the normative case,
contrasexual self-attributed motives remain much less
developed than gender-congruent contrasexual motives.
Conceptual judgments about personal attributes, as
solicited by respondent motive questionnaires, may involve
a cognitive review of memories of operant behavior rather
than consultation with an abstract, stable self schema.
Again, the latter process would explain the high level of
operant-respondent correspondence procured.
Intermotive Congruence and Self-Consciousness Variables
Inner-directedness.

Contrary to predictions, inner-

directedness did not enhance motive congruence.

In fact,

comparison of pertinent correlational magnitudes and mean
differences at times suggests an opposite effect, such
that inner-directedness is related to decreased motive
congruence.

This trend was especially evident in the case

of males and agency, where division of subjects into high
and low inner-directedness groups shed new light on males'
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negligible baseline intermotive correspondence.
Specifically, males low in inner-directedness evidence
substantial agentic intermotive congruence, while high
inner-directedness males display equally substantial
intermotive discordance.

In both male and female samples,

inner-directedness was related to decreased contrasexual
intermotive congruence, albeit inconsistently.

Inner-

directedness had no effect on gender-congruent intermotive
congruence for females.

In three out of four cases, then,

some evidence related low inner-directedness to enhanced
congruence.
Although the above results were not predicted, the
existence of any sort of inner-directedness effect on
intermotive congruence is somewhat supportive of
McClelland et al. 's (1989) position.

The fact that a

psychological construct mediates correspondence seems more
supportive of construct-based as opposed to measure-based
interpretations.

In other words, it is unclear why a

self-consciousness variable should affect operantrespondent relationships if one or the other measure type
is generally invalid.

If operant and respondent measures

typically fail to relate due to psychometric problems,
then improvement of the measures alone, and not selection
of certain types of subjects, should bolster congruence.
Instead, both the unexpected baseline patterns of
intermotive relationship and the unpredicted results for
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inner-directedness suggest a psychological rather than
psychometric explanation.

Actually, the obtained results suggest a framing of
inner-directedness vis-a-vis the bi-level motivational
system that departs from that advanced earlier.

Inner-

directedness is clearly not a cause or agent of
intermotive congruence.

Instead, it may be a product or

effect of motive misalignment.

Discrepancy between

implicit and self-attributed systems seems an apt
operationalization of general neurosis.

Rogers (1963),

for example, comments:
Estrangement of conscious man from his directional
organismic processes is not a necessary part of man's
nature ..• The satisfaction ..• of the actualizing
tendency has become bifurcated into incompatible
behavior systems. This dissociation which exists in
most of us is the pattern and basis of all
psychological pathology in man
(p. 24)
Similarly, psychodynamic theorists such as Freud (1933)
identify unresolved incongruities between id (i.e.,
implicit system) and superego (i.e., self-attributed
system) as a basis for neurotic conflict.

In the context

of neurotic conflict, inner-directedness takes-on a
different connotation from that typically presented.
Rather than with openness to experience and an
integration-fostering self-focus, inner-directedness may
be closely allied with defensive aims.

Inner-

directedness, especially as assessed via respondent
questionnaire, may represent the self-attributed system's
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attempt at managing implicit presses at odds with the
self-image.

Along these lines, Shabad (1991) reflects:

The analytical function of scrutinizing behavior, or
consciously observing before participating, reflects
a radical mistrust of unconscious impulses and their
corollary actions ... Indeed, as one gains in selfknowledge, one increasingly becomes equipped also
with a foreknowledge that enables one to avoid
unconscious patterns of ... behavior
(p. 10)
Inner-directedness' private self-consciousness facet is in
fact related to low self-esteem, a general marker of
neurotic conflict (Turner et al., 1978).
From a psychodynamic perspective, intermotive
misalignment is reframed as neurotic conflict, and innerdirectedness becomes mental vigilance.

Furthermore, this

reframing affords coherence to previously incomprehensible
results.

Mental vigilance is a normative response to

neurotic conflict, and retrospectively, it makes sense
that inner-directedness would be related to intermotive
misalignment rather than alignment.

Past research on

private self-consciousness, the more well-researched of
inner-directedness' two facets, can also be assimilated by
the above interpretation.

First, a number of studies have

linked private self-consciousness to increased selfreport/behavior congruence (Scheier et al., 1978; Turner,
1978). From the present vantage, private selfconsciousness is the tool with which the self-attributed
system brings "the unpredictable dynamics of a given
process under omnipotent mental control" (Shabad, 1991, p.

165

8).

Hence, individuals high in private self-consciousness

"do what they say,'' because they have achieved conscious
control over implicit sectors that remain unfettered in
others.

Furthermore, their higher aggressiveness

(Scheier, 1976) represents the price paid for chronic
overcontrol:

"it is often what is ruled out that rises

and asserts itself, so there is not mastery precisely
where mastery ought to be" (Bakan, 1966, p. 89).
Other-directedness.

The hypothesis that other-

directedness is related to decreased intermotive
congruence received support only in the case of females'
communal motives.

Specifically, communal intermotive

correspondence was higher for women low in otherdirectedness than for women high in other-directedness.
Female agentic intermotive correspondence failed to be
consistently and substantially affected by otherdirectedness.

The results for males suggest an absence of

other-directedness effect in the case of agency.
Likewise, other-directedness is probably unrelated to
communal intermotive alignment in males, although some
inconsistent evidence suggested an unpredicted
relationship between other-directedness and enhanced
communal motive correspondence.

If nothing else, the

obtained pattern of results underscores the differences
between masculine and feminine psychologies.

It may well

be that other-directedness has a different meaning or

166
dynamic significance for the male psyche than for the
female psyche.

Unfortunately, the present investigation

was not equipped to further elucidate such differences.
Earlier, other-directedness was framed as a probable
facilitator of intermotive incongruence.

As with inner-

directedness, however, it may be more accurate to consider
other-directedness as a symptom or result of intermotive
misalignment, or general neurotic conflict.

In fact, both

person-centered (e.g., Rogers, 1959) and psychodynamic
(e.g., Kohut & Wolfe, 1978; Winnicott, 1965) theories
"predict that the wider the discrepancy between one's
public and private selves (i.e., implicit and selfattributed systems), the greater the individual's anxiety,
conformity, and sensitivity to social cues suggesting
appropriate behavior" (Tunnell, 1984, p. 549).

If this is

correct, then the absence of a clear other-directedness
effect for males, combined with the aforementioned robust,
unpredicted inner-directedness effect, may suggest a
certain approach to managing chronic psychological duress.
Specifically, intense inner scrutiny may be preferable to
conformity and other-focus, as it preserves a sense of
agentic self-reliance, which is a cornerstone of the
normative male ideal (Bern, 1981).

Females, on the other

hand, seem to prefer communal adaptations to inner
misalignment, and may also be more adaptationally
flexible, turning to both other- and inner-directedness.
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It was also hypothesized in the present investigation
that inner- and other-directedness would interact so as to
maximize intermotive correspondence.

This hypothesis

could not be definitively examined due to (1) operant
indices' skewed distributions, and (2) small Ns, which
precluded within-gender analyses.

Visual inspection of

correlational data, however, suggests (very tentatively)
an absence of any form of summative effect.
Relationships Between Motives and Motive-Like Constructs
Personality abilities.

Contrary to predictions,

agentic and communal personality abilities were no more
aligned with the implicit system than were their selfattributed counterparts.

The most obvious explanation for

this finding is that McClelland et al. 's (1989)
formulations regarding a bi-level motivational system are
incorrect; this possibility will be further addressed
later.
well.

A number of alternate explanations are possible as
First, it may be that the predicted maximal measure

effect does exist, but is quite small.

This

interpretation is supported by the fact that
nonsignificant results uniformly fell in predicted
directions, except in the case of male communal
intermotive relationships.

Second, it may be that the

ability measure employed was invalid--this was an
unresearched measure constructed solely for the present
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investigation.

Finally, it may be that personality

abilities, at least when assessed via respondent
questionnaires, are interchangeable with self-attributed
motives; the constructs' shared verbal, self-schematic
similarities may outweigh their conceptual differences.
Personal strivings.

In the present conceptualization

of the bi-level motivational system, personal strivings
are intersystem mediators.

Strivings' proposed

topographic location actually spawned two related
hypotheses.

First, it was expected that strivings would

be more closely aligned with implicit motives than would
be self-attributed motives.

Correlational and Wilcoxon

analyses of this proposition produced inconsistent and
generally nonsupportive results.
motives,

§

In the case of agentic

Agency is probably no more closely aligned with

n Agency than is san Agency.

In the case of communion, §

Communion and san Communion appear equally and moderately
related to n Communion.

The second hypothesis predicted

that strivings would be more strongly related to selfattributed motives than would be implicit motives.

In

this regard, an unexpected pattern of results emerged.
Specifically, confirmatory patterns were obtained in
gender-congruent motivational domains, while contrasexual
domains produced nonsupportive (men) and opposing (women)
patterns.

Actually, these findings make sense in light of

the previously-advanced speculations regarding gender and
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self-attributed motive development.

It was mentioned

earlier that gender-congruent self-attributed motives may
be normatively out of alignment with the implicit domain,
due to the farmer's basis in pat societal ideologies
rather than in empathic attunement to individual nature.
Maintenance of gender-congruent self-attributed motives,
then, often amounts to a struggle to maintain a socially
desirable, socially mandated self-image in the face of
implicit nature.

The obtained results suggest that

strivings may be allies of the self-attributed system in
this struggle, comprising a verbally-represented (as
opposed to visceral) goal system.

In summary, the general

framing of personal strivings as intersystem mediators
received inconsistent support in the present
investigation.
The Bi-Level Motivational System in Perspective
The approach taken thus far in the present discussion
has been to account for findings relevant to individual
hypotheses piecemeal.

Along the way, separate

explanations have been advanced for each group of
findings, many of which were unpredicted and/or
nonsupportive.

This bevy of speculations should not

obscure a more basic fact.

Experimental hypotheses were

generally not confirmed, and thus, strong support for
McClelland et al. 's bi-level motivational system has not
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been obtained.

Indeed, the most parsimonious explanation

for obtained patterns is that the implicit/self-attributed
motive framework is faulty.

Although parsimonious,

however, such conclusions seem unwarranted in the face of
two findings.

First, the most basic unpredicted finding

of the present study is that contrasexual implicit and
self-attributed motives do evidence substantial
correspondence.

When both are adequately sampled, then,

contrasexual implicit and self-attributed systems
evidence an appreciable interrelation.

Second, this

baseline correspondence can be enhanced by various selfconsciousness variables: low inner-directedness, or
artlessness, enhances intermotive correspondence for males
and perhaps females, while low other-directedness further
enhances congruence for females.

While both these

findings are assimilable via McClelland et al. 's model,
albeit with a

few modifications to account for gender

effects, they are not assimilable by psychometric
explanations: if operant and respondent measures do not
interrelate because of psychometric shortcomings, then
this interrelation should hold for gender-congruent and
contrasexual motives.

It does not.

Furthermore,

psychometric explanations do not readily account for
intermotive correspondence's mediation by selfconsciousness variables, regardless of the direction of
mediational effects.

If the misalignment is "in the
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measures," then factors "in the person" should not
substantially reduce misalignment.
Limitations of the Present Work and Suggestions for Future
Research
The present work has serious limitations in the areas
of statistical conclusion validity, internal validity, and
external validity.

The major problems in each of these

areas will now be addressed.

Statistical conclusion

validity was firstly compromised by small Ns, which
resulted in low statistical power.

This limitation was

especially evident in within-gender analyses, where
memberships in various comparison groups (e.g., low otherdirectedness males, high inner-directedness females, etc.)
typically ranged from 20-30.

Additionally, the sheer

number of analyses conducted (over 60) certainly led to a
few spuriously significant results.

The above factors

probably interacted with. the idiosyncrasies of various
statistical techniques to produce the rampant
inconsistencies observed between (seemingly) parallel
mean-comparison and correlational analyses.
The most prominent threat to internal validity stems
from the present work's basis in correlational, rather
than experimental, approaches.

The characterological

natures of inner- and other-directedness prevented the
experimental manipulation of the variables, as well as the
subsequent random assignment of subjects to high- and low-
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inner/other-directedness conditions.

Consequently, other

uncontrolled variables were left free to covary with
experimental variables.

Indeed, such unchecked

covariation may account for some of the unexpected
findings:

constructs such as defensiveness,

hypervigilance, insightfulness, inner receptivity,
openness to experience, and dependence may relate to one
or the other of the focal variables.

Indeed, measures for

inner- and other-directedness have as yet to be
empirically discriminated from the above concepts.
The inviability of random assignment in the present
research also fostered ambiguity regarding the direction
of causal influence.

As elaborated earlier, it is unclear

whether the self-consciousness variables cause intermotive
noncorrespondence or reflect symptomatic reactions to it.
As regards external validity, the present research is
hampered by its exclusive focus on college students.

It

is by no means clear that relationships obtained for
individ~als

traversing the maturational threshold between

familial embeddedness and adult autonomy would generalize
to fully individuated adults.

Similarly, propositions

unsupported by the data may in fact hold for an older,
adult population.
The most obvious general suggestion for future
research is that the present investigation be replicated.
such a replication would feature the post-hoc explanations
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advanced above as a priori hypotheses.

For example,

moderate contrasexual intermotive correspondence would be
predicted, and inner-directedness would be expected to
relate to decreased correspondence.

Future research in

this area would additionally do well to examine other
potential mediators of intermotive alignment.

For

example, neuroticism and anxiety should be related to
motive misalignment, while maturity, integration, and
subjective well-being should be related to relative motive
alignment.

A particularly powerful test of McClelland et

al.'s (1989) ideas might be conducted in a mental health
setting: psychotherapy should enhance intermotive
congruence, and therapists' ratings of psychological
integration should roughly correspond with operantrespondent alignment.
On a more general note, motivational researchers,
especially those employing TAT motive measures, should be
alerted to the need for more rigorous motive assessment.
The present study relied upon the comprehensive, composite
assessment of general motivational clusterings.

This

broader sampling allowed for the uncovering of a
relationship that departs from the lack of intermotive
correlation reported by the TAT community.

In short,

researchers such as McClelland (1980) and Koestner et al.
(1988) may be confusing sampling error with motive
noncorrespondence.

Gender, as discussed earlier, seems to
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be the biggest mediator of motive congruence.

Should

future replications corroborate this conclusion, then
McClelland et al.'s (1989) system must be refined to
account for gender effects.

Some tentative refinements of

this sort were advanced above.

It is also incumbent upon

implicit motive researchers to develop alternate measures
of implicit motives--measures that relate with TAT indices
in predictable ways.

The demonstration of such

relationships is crucial to the implicit system's validity
as a legitimate, coherent domain.

While the present study

employed alternate implicit motive measures, they were of
insufficient length to definitively speak on this issue.
Summary
The primary aim of the present investigation was to
examine and clarify the well-documented failure of operant
and respondent motive measures to interrelate.

Critics

such as Entwisle (1972) and Raven (1988) have implicated
psychometric flaws in one or the other type of measure as
the cause for this failure.

For them, both types of

measure tap the same construct, only more or less well.
McClelland et al.

(1989), on the other hand, assert that

operant and respondent measures tap distinct motivational
layers within the individual, layers which need not be in
accord.

Obtained results were partially supportive of

both psychometric and construct-based explanations, though
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definitively supportive of neither.

The psychometric

perspective was vindicated in that predictions for
strivings and personality abilities were generally not
supported.

Additionally, the comprehensive, composite

measurement of agentic and communal motives apparently
allowed for the uncovering of intermotive relationships
previously submerged in measurement error.

In short,

contrasexual motives showed an appreciable amount of
correspondence, while gender-congruent motives did not.
Psychometric explanations, however, can accommodate
neither (1) low other-directedness' predicted congruenceenhancing effect (females' communal motives only),
(2) the mediation of intermotive congruence by gender, nor
(3) inner-directedness' unpredicted congruence-lessening
effect.

While McClelland et al. 's (1989) bi-level

motivational theory did not predict the latter two
findings a priori, it can be modified post hoc to account
for them.

The restriction of normative motive

misalignment to gender-congruent domains probably follows
from the parental/societal imposition of explicit gender
schemata.

It is further proposed that inner-directedness

and other-directedness are responses to motive
incongruence, or neurosis, rather than facilitators of it.
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